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LIBERTY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
JOHN RAEBURN GREENt
I. GITLOW VS. NEW YORK
When the Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York said:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press-which are protected by the 1st
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from im-
pairment by the States,'
it was announcing, with extraordinary brevity, a view which it
had more than once rejected in the past. The enlargement of
the Fourteenth Amendment which has resulted from this single
sentence has already profoundly increased the liberty of the indi-
vidual, at the expense of the powers of the states; and the full
extent of the effect produced is not yet, after seventeen years,
visible. The circumstances which in 1925 induced and indeed
compelled the Court to effect a constitutional reform of so great
magnitude, and with a history so long and so uniformly unfor-
tunate, deserve examination.
A. Madison's Amendment and the Bifl of Rights
The effort to protect freedom of speech and of the press from
impairment by the states had, in fact, commenced before the
adoption of the First Amendment. Madison's draft of the Bill
of Rights, submitted to the First Congress on June 8, 1789, in-
cluded the following: "No State shall violate the equal rights of
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases."' 2 He urged, "I cannot see any reason against
obtaining even a double security on these points * * * because
* * * the State Governments are as liable to attack these invalu-
able privileges as the General Government is * * * "; and later,
in debate on August 17, 1789, said that he "conceived this to be
the most valuable amendment in the whole list." The Amend-
t A.B., Westminster College, 1914; LL.B., Harvard University, 1917.
Member of St. Louis Bar.
1. (1925) 268 U. S. 652, 666. The opinion is by Mr. Justice Sanford.
2. Ann. Cong. 1st Cong., 1st Sess., House of Rep., June 8, 1789 (1 Gales,
Debates and Proceedings (1834), 452.)
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ment, as subsequently modified in the House to indlude freedom
of speech," was passed by the House, but rejected by the Senate,
the House later concurring.'
The exclusion was deliberate, and the intention of Congress
must have been quite clear, both from that and because the Bill
of Rights in terms restricted only the federal government. But
the vitality of the idea, notwithstanding these considerations,
was so great as to suggest that it was an essential part of our
constitutional scheme. Commencing in 1833,5 the contention that
the first Ten Amendments restricted the powers of the states
was repeatedly pressed upon the Court, and uniformly rejected
by it.
3. As passed by the House the Amendment read: "The equal rights of
conscience, the freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial byjury in criminal cases, shall not be infringed by any State." Ann. Cong.,
supra note 2, August 17, 1789. While the Amendment went beyond the
"freedom of speech and of the press" of the Gitlow case, its limits, in its
final form, are not so far from those since developed by the Court. See
Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 324-325, and discussion under
II, infra.
For a reference to contemporary newspaper publications favoring the
Amendment, see Warren, History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 121.
4. See Warren, The New "Liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment
(1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 433-435. In dealing with the cases prior to
1926, I am under the heaviest obligation to this article.
5. Barron v. Baltimore (U. S. 1883) 7 Pet. 243.
6. In Barron v. Baltimore (U. S. 1833) 7 Pet. 243, and Withers v.
Buckley (U. S. 1857) 20 How. 84, the protection of the Fifth Amendment
was denied to a deprivation of property by a state. In Lessee of Livingston
v. Moore (U. S. 1833) 7 Pet. 469, 551-552, the Court remarked that the
Seventh (trial by jury in civil actions) and Ninth Amendments did not
apply to state legislation; in Permoli v. New Orleans (U. S. 1845) 3 How.
589, 609, it was held that the First Amendment imposed no inhibition on
the states with respect to religious liberty; in Fox v. Ohio (U. S. 1847) 5
How. 410, the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment was
held not to restrict a state; in Smith v. Maryland (U. S. 1855) 18 How.
71, the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against the issuance of war-
rants except upon probable cause was held not to apply to a warrant issued
by a state. In Pervear v. Massachusetts (U. S. 1866) 5 Wall. 475, the
provision of the Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punish-
ment was held not to apply to state legislation. These were all the decisions
prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 (Pervear v.
Massachusetts, supra, was decided while the Amendment was under sub-
mission to the states for ratification). In Twitchell v. Pennsylvania (U. S.
1869) 7 Wall. 321, the Sixth Amendment was held not to apply to the states.
See also United States v. Cruikshank (1876) 92 U. S. 542, 552-3, where the
First Amendment (here the right peaceably to assemble) and the Second
Amendment (the right to keep and bear arms) were said not to limit the
powers of the states. None of these cases dealt with freedom of speech or
of the press. Nevertheless the earlier opinions, notably Chief Justice
Marshall's in Barron v. Baltimore, supra, and Justice Daniel's in Fox v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss4/1
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B. The Privileges and !nmunitea Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment? became a part of the Constitution
in 1868. With its adoption a different and more persuasive con-
tention became available, and was soon urged upon the Court,
side by side with the effort to have the 'Bill of Rights construed
as limiting the powers of the states, which continued, unabated
either by invariable defeat in the Court or by the fact that the
new Amendment had opened a more promising avenue of attack."
It was first urged that the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protected against state abridgment
a considerable variety of individual rights, derived from state
constitutions or state laws, many of these being identical with
rights which were protected by the Bill of Rights against federal
impairment. The Fourteenth Amendment first came before the
Court in the Slaughter House Cases,9 where the meaning of the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" which
no state law might now abridge, provoked a wide diversity of
Ohio, supra, and in Withers v. Buckley, supra, were so emphatic and rested
upon so broad a foundation that it seems certain that freedom of speech
would have met the same fate, if the question had been presented. Cf. Mr.
Justice Butler, dissenting in Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U. S. 697,
728-724.
7. The relevant portion is the second sentence of Section 1: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law * * *."
8. As late as 1913 the effort (uncoupled with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) was still being made and still receiving short shrift from the Court.
Ensign v. Pennsylvania (1913) 227 U. S. 592. See also Warren, supra note
4, at 436: "Apparently the Bar was not even then [1857] discouraged from
attempting to overturn Marshall's decision [Barron v. Baltimore (U. S.
1888) 7 Pet. 243]; for the point was again raised in a Pennsylvania case,
in 1869, on which occasion, Chief Justice Chase said that it was 'no longer
subject of discussion.' It was raised again in 1876, when Chief Justice
Waite said: 'It is now too late to question the correctness of this con-
struction.' In spite of this emphatic language, counsel for defendants,
whether by reason of ignorance, incorrigible optimism, or desire for delay,
continued to urge (chiefly in murder and other criminal cases), that the
Federal Bill of Rights applied to State Legislation. In at least twenty cases
between 1877 and 1907, the Court was required to rule upon this point and
to reaffirm Marshall's decision of 1833, in opinions in which it asserted that
the doctrine had been 'held over and over again,' 'elementary,' 'well estab-
lished' 'so frequently held, as not to warrant the citation of many authori-
ties.'"
In my view, the persistence of the effort was not so much due to the
considerations mentioned by Mr. Warren, as to the belief, impossible to
substantiate but nevertheless profound, that the Constitution could not have
left these fundamental and vital liberties wholly unprotected against state
abridgment.
9. (U. S. 1873) 16 Wall. 36.
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opinion. The decision itself dealt simply with the constitutionality
of a Louisiana statute establishing a monopoly in the business
of maintaining yards, landing places and slaughter-houses for
stock, within a limited area, the facilities being open to the public
and the charges for their use being fixed by law. The majority
considered that this statute did not deprive butchers of the right
to labor in their occupation or seriously interfere with their
business, since it did not, as claimed, "prevent the butcher from
doing his own slaughtering." No liberty recognized by the Bill
of Rights was involved in the case. But the opinions (there
were four) went far afield. Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for
the majority, excluded the privileges and immunities "belong-
ing to the citizen of the State as such," from the protection
of the Amendment. He declined to define the federal privileges
and immunities which were within the protection "until some
case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do so";
but he did list some examples of such rights, including "the right
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances."
Mr. Justice Field, dissenting (with whom Chief Justice Chase
and Justices Swayne and Bradley concurred), considered that
the privileges protected were "fundamental privileges," "those
which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments."
Mr. Justice Bradley, dissenting separately, went further and was
specific: he defined them to include the rights guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, many of which, including those guaranteed by the
First Amendment, he enumeratedY'
The wide scope of the opinions in the Slaughter House Cases
and the variety of the views expressed resulted in renewed efforts
to induce the Court to extend and clarify its interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause.,- Three years later, in Walker
v. Sauvinet,12 although the point had not been specifically raised,
the Court briefly said, without consideration of the question, that
the right to trial by jury in suits at common law, guaranteed by
10. Two years earlier Judge Woods (later a Justice of the Supreme
Court) had held that freedom of speech and the right peaceably to assemble
were privileges and immunities within the protection of the 14th Amend-
ment and had expressed the view that all the rights guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights were likewise so protected. United States v. Hall (C. C. S. D. Ala.
1871) Fed. Cas. 15, 282. The decision is not mentioned in the Slaughter-
House Cases.
11. See Warren, supra note 4, 437-438.
12. (1876) 92 U. S. 90.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss4/1
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the Seventh Amendment, was not "a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Four-
teenth Amendment to abridge." Justices Clifford and Field dis-
sented without opinion. Also in 1876, in United States v. Cruik-
shank,18 a Reconstruction case, it was urged, apparently in reli-
ance upon Mr. Justice Miller's dictum in the Slaughter House
Cases, that the right of peaceable assembly was within the pro-
tection of the clause. The Court said that "the right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for
a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the
powers or the duties of the National Government," was within
the protection of the clause; but it held the indictment to be de-
feetive, since the offense, as there stated, could have been made
out by showing "that the object of the conspiracy was to prevent
a meeting for any lawful purpose whatever." And in 1886, in
Presser v. lUinois,1' the Court affirmed a conviction under an
Illinois statute prohibiting any persons other than the regular
organized militia from associating and drilling or parading with
arms, which statute, it had been claimed, violated the Second
Amendment and also the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth. The Court said that the states could not, even aside
from the Second Amendment, "prohibit the people from keeping
and bearing arms," but held that the statute clearly did not have
this effect.
In Spies v. Illinois,'1 it was claimed, for the first time, that
while the Bill of Rights limited only the Federal Government,
nevertheless so far as it declared or recognized "rights of per-
soas," these rights were protected against state abridgment by
the privileges and immunities clause. Specifically, the protection
13. (1876) 92 U. S. 542.
14. (1886) 116 U. S. 252. The Court also considered that the statute did
not violate the right peaceably to assemble, as defined in United States v.
Cruikshank (1876) 92 U. S. 542. The opinion is by Mr. Justice Woods, who
had, fifteen years earlier, decided United States v. Hall (C. C. S. D. Ala.
1871) Fed. Cas. 15, 282. Mr. Warren (supra note 4, at 459) considers
Presser v. Illinois, supra, to be a decision that the right to keep and bear
arms is not one of the "privileges and immunities," but I cannot so regard
it.
In connection with the consideration of "liberty," infra, it may be noted
that the Court in Presser v. Illinois (supra at 268), said that the argument
that the statute amounted to a deprivation "of either life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law *** is so clearly untenable as to require
no discussion."
15. (1887) 123 U. S. 131.
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was claimed for rights under the Fourth (security against un-
reasonable searches and seizures), Fifth (privilege against self-
incrimination), and Sixth (right to jury trial) Amendments.
But the Court again avoided a decision, holding that these federal
questions did not appear on the face of the state court record.16
Similarly, in O'Neil v. Vermont,17 where it was contended that
the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and un-
usual punishment was now a privilege or immunity protected by
the clause, the Court held that this question was not before it on
the record, and did not consider it; but Mr. Justice Field and
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting separately, each very vigorously
expressed the view that not only this right but all of the rights
guaranteed by the Bill of -Rights were "privileges or immunities"
which the Fourteenth Amendment forbade a state to abridge.
In Maxwell v. DoUr8 the Court for the first time"' dealt
squarely with the question. There it was again argued that all
of the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights were privileges
or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court, in a careful opinion,20 held that neither the grand jury
indictment guaranteed by the first clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment nor the right to jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment was within the protection, Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting
vigorously.
In 1907 the Court for the first time was confronted, in Patter-
son v. Colorado,2' with the claim that freedom of the press was
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state abridg-
16. For a contemporary discussion of this case, disposing rather too
easily of the claim advanced, see Dunbar, The Anarchists' Case (1887)
1 Harv. L. Rev. 307.
17. (1892) 144 U. S. 323.
18. (1900) 176 U. S. 581.
19. Two earlier decisions had dealt rather inconclusively with a New
York statute which it was claimed imposed cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In re Kemmler (1890) 136 U. S.
436; McElvaine v. Brush (1891) 142 U. S. 155. I cannot see that they hold,
either singly or conjunctively, any more than that the statute did not in-
flict cruel and unusual punishment, but Mr. Warren (supra note 4, at 439,
459) places a broader interpretation on them.
20. The Court apparently desired to limit its decision to the points be-
fore it. It said [(1900) 176 U. S. 581] at 597-598: "* * * the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States do not necessarily include
all the rights protected by the first Eight Amendments to the Federal
Constitution."
21. (1907) 205 U. S. 454.
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ment.22 Patterson had been convicted of contempt of court for
the publication of certain articles and a cartoon reflecting upon
the Supreme Court of Colorado. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for the Court, said: "We leave undecided the question whether
there is to be found in the 14th Amendment a prohibition similar
to that in the First,"' '  and affirmed the conviction upon the
ground that freedom of the press did not include immunity from
subsequent punishment. Mr. Justice Harlan, in a notable dis-
senting opinion, held that the freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the First Amendment were privileges or immuni-
ties which no state could abridge.2'
A year later, in Twining v. New Jersey,2 5 Mr. Justice Moody,
for the Court, held that the privilege against self-incrimination,
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, was not protected by the
privileges and immunities clause against state abridgment, re-
marking that Maxwell v. Dow, supra, had determined that the
clause "did not forbid the States to abridge the personal rights
enumerated in the first eight Amendments * * *,,26 Mr. Justice
Harlan again dissented. 27 In Gilbert v. MinnesotaL" in 1920, the
point was not considered by the Court; but Mr. Justice Brandeis,
dissenting, said that a state law abridging freedom of speech
"affects rights, privileges and immunities of one who is a citizen
of the United States * * * These are rights which are guaranteed
protection by the Federal Constitution * * *."
Upon this front no battle had yet been won, but the struggle
22. The claim was apparently to the protection of the Amendment gen-
erally, and not to the privileges and immunities clause specifically. The
Court remarked (id. at 461-462) : "* * * it is easier to refer to the Con-
stitution generally for the supposed right than to point to the clause from
which it springs."
23. (1907) 205 U. S. 454, 462.
24. Id. at 463.
25. (1908) 211 U. S. 78.
26. Id. at 99.
27. See in particular id. at 124-125: "I am of the opinion that, as im-
munity from self-incrimination was recognized in the 5th Amendment of
the Constitution, and placed beyond violation by any Federal Agency, it
should be deemed one of the immunities of citizens of the United States
which the 14th Amendment, in express terms, forbids any state from
abridgingr-as much so, for instance, as the right of free speech (Amend. I),
or the exemption from cruel or unusual punishments (Amend. VIII), or the
exemption from being put: twice in jeopardy of life or limb for the same
offense (Amend. V), or the exemption from unreasonable searches, and
seizures of one's person, house, papers, or effects (Amend. IV)."
28. 254 U. S. 325, 336.
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can hardly have appeared to be without hope .2  All that had so
far been decided-each time over a powerful dissent-was that
the requirement of a grand jury indictment and the privilege
against self-incrimination, contained in the Fifth Amendment,
the right to trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions, guaranteed
by the Sixth, and the right to trial by jury in suits at common
law, guaranteed by the Seventh,30 were not among the "privileges
or immunities" which were no longer subject to state abridg-
ment. The dicta in the Slaughter House Cases3' and in United
States v. Cruikshanld'2 regarding the right of peaceable assembly
had been often quoted, but never repudiated; and in Patterson v.
Colorado"5 the Court had been careful to leave undecided the
question with respect to freedom of the press. The profound
feeling that the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights must
somehow have constitutional protection against state invasion
was not only so persistent, but so explosive in its force (as some
of the dissenting opinions mentioned above indicate) that ulti-
mately protection for these rights might conceivably have been
obtained by means of the privileges and immunities clause,34 if
29. But cf. Warren, supra note 4, at 439.
30. Possibly also the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment against cruel
and unusual punishment. See note 19, supra.
31. (U. S. 1873) 16 Wall. 36.
32. (1876) 92 U. S. 542.
33. (1907) 205 U. S. 454.
34. While this is conceivable, it does not, in the light of later cases,
appear probable. There was, of course, no need to continue the struggle
under the privileges and immunities clause, so far as freedom of speech was
concerned, once Gitlow v. New York (1925) 268 U. S. 652, established that
these rights were adequately protected by the due process clause. Other
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights might also be taken, by analogy, to
have perhaps a better claim to protection as "liberty," than as "privileges
or immunities." In Hamilton v. University of California (1934) 293 U. S.
245, where it was contended that compulsory military training, which did
violence to the religious convictions of certain students, not only deprived
them of their religious liberty without due process of law, but abridged their
privileges and immunities, the Court said (at 261): "The only 'immunity'
claimed by these students is freedom from obligation to comply with the rule
prescribing military training. But that 'immunity' cannot be regarded as
not within, or as distinguishable from, the 'liberty' of which they claim to
have been deprived by the enforcement of the regents' order. If the regents'
order is not repugnant to the due process clause, then it does not violate the
privileges and immunities clause. Therefore we need only decide whether by
state action the 'liberty' of these students has been infringed." And in
Colgate v. Harvey (1935) 296 U. S. 404, 433, the Court, dealing with a state
income tax law, said: "The right of a citizen of the United States resident in
one state to contract in another may be a liberty safeguarded by the due
process of law clause, and at the same time, none the less, a privilege pro-
tected by the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment. In
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss4/1
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protection for freedom of the press had not soon been obtained in
Gitlow v. New York 35 under the succeeding clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
C. Due Process and Liberty
This third front, on which the struggle had already com-
menced, was the due process clause.3 6 As is well known, this can
such case he may invoke either or both." However, Mr. Justice Stone's dis-
sent in Colgate v. Harvey, supra at 444, should be noted: " * * even those
basic privileges and immunities secured against federal infringement by the
first eight amendments have been held not to be protected from state action
by the privileges and immunities clause."
Two years later in Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 329, the
claim was made that the right against double jeopardy (guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment) was protected under the privileges and immunities
clause, but the Court, through Mr. Justice Cardozo, said that "Maxwell v.
Dow gives all the answer that is necessary" to this argument.
Notwithstanding all this, in Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496,
three members of the Court (Justices Roberts and Black, with whom Chief
Justice Hughes apparently concurred), for reasons which their opinion does
not make clear, undertook to protect the rights of freedom of speech and of
peaceable assembly (sought to be exercised in order to give information
regarding, and to discuss, the National Labor Relations Act) against in-
vasion by a Jersey City ordinance, as privileges and immunities (citing the
dicta of the Slaughter House Cases (U. S. 1873) 16 Wall. 36, and United
States v. Cruikshank (1876) 92 U. S. 542), rather than as liberty under the
due process clause. Mr. Justice Stone, in an opinion joined in by Mr. Justice
Reed, concurred in the protection, but placed it upon the ground that it had
"been explicitly and repeatedly affirmed by this Court, without a dissenting
voice, that freedom of speech and of assembly for any lawful purpose are
rights of personal liberty secured to all persons, without regard to citizen-
ship, by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. * * * It has never
been held that either is a privilege or an immunity peculiar to the citizen-
ship of the United States, to which alone the privileges and immunities
clause refers * * * and neither can be brought within the protection of that
clause without enlarging the category of privileges and immunities of
United States citizenship as it has hitherto been defined." Hague v. C. I. 0.,
supra, at 519. He pointed out (at 520-521 footnote), that "of the fifty or
more cases" brought to the Court since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in which state statutes had been assailed as violating the
privileges and immunities clause, in only one (Colgate v. Harvey) had the
Court held that a privilege or immunity had been infringed. Cf. Chambers
v. Florida (1940) 309 U. S. 227, 235-36, footnote, where, a year later, Mr.
Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous court, said: "* * * There has been
a current of opinion-which this Court has declined to adopt in many previ-
ous cases-that the 14th Amendment was intended to make secure against
state invasion all the right, privileges and immunities protected from Fed-
eral violation by the Bill of Rights (Amendments 1 to 8)."
85. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
86. The privileges and immunities clause was in terms an absolute bar
to abridgment, as was the First Amendment; but the prohibition against
state deprivation of life, liberty or property is subject to the qualification,
"without due process of law." Cf. Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissenting, in
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board (1937) 301 U. S. 103,
185.
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be traced, by way of the Fifth Amendment, and the state con-
stitutions adopted between 1780 and 1789, to Magna Charta, if
not beyond.37 It seems clear that in 1789 "liberty," in the Fifth
Amendment, meant no more than freedom from physical re-
straint of the person.3 8 It is significant that between 1789 and
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Supreme
Court had no occasion to define the meaning of the word as used'
in the Fifth Amendment. During this period the state courts
had in a few instances dealt with the "liberty" secured by the
due process clauses of the state constitutions, but apparently in
only one of these cases had it then been given a broader meaning
than restraint of the person.39
But very early after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment there were intimations that "liberty" might no longer be
so rigidly confined. In the Slaughter House Cases Mr. Justice
Bradley, dissenting, had said:
In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens
from adopting a lawful employment, or from following a
lawful employment previously adopted, does deprive them of
liberty as well as property, without due process of law. Their
right of choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation
is their property.40
In 1884 Mr. Justice Bradley again expressed this view in
Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Etc. Company v. Crescent City
Live Stock Company4l in an opinion concurring in the result.
Justices Harlan and Woods concurred in this 'opinion. In 1888
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court in Powell v. Penn-
sylvania,'42 held that a Pennsylvania statute regulating the man-
ufacture and sale of oleomargarine was not inconsistent with
37. See Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those
Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions which Protect "Life, Liberty
and Property" (1891) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 368-374.
38. See Shattuck, supra note 37, at 375-378; Warren, supra note 4, at
441.
39. The exception was a case in which a state prohibition law was held
invalid as an invasion of liberty, the Indiana Supreme Court saying that
"the right of liberty and pursuing happiness secured by the constitution"
embraced the individual's right to select what he would eat and drink, "in
short, his beverages * * *." Herman v. State (1855) 8 Ind. 545, 558; see
Warren, supra note 4, at 443-444. But this may have come within "pursuing
happiness" rather than "liberty."
40. (U. S. 1873) 16 Wall. 36, 122.
41. (1884) 111 U. S. 746, 765.
42. (1888) 127 U. S. 678.
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the Fourteenth Amendment, but said, as dictum, that the right
to "enjoyment upon terms of equality with all others in similar
circumstances of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling
or trade, and of acquiring, holding and selling property," was
an essential part of the "rights of liberty and property, as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Mr. Justice Field,
dissenting, said:
By "liberty," as thus used, is meant something more than
freedom from physical restraint or imprisonment. It means
freedom not merely to go wherever one may choose, but to
do such acts as he may judge best for his interests not incon-
sistent with the equal rights of others; that is, to follow such
pursuits as may be best adapted to his faculties, and which
will give to him the highest enjoyment. 3
And in 1897, Allgeyer v. Louisiana" at last enlarged the mean-
ing of "liberty" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment by hold-
ing that it includ.d the liberty of a citizen of a state to contract
outside the state for insurance on his property therein, of which
liberty state legislation could not deprive him. Mr. Justice Peck-
ham, speaking for a unanimous Court, quoted and adopted the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Butchers' Union
case, supra, and Mr. Justice Harlan's dictum in Powell v.
Pennsylvania, supra, saying: "In the privilege of pursuing an
ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding and selling
property must be embraced the right to make all proper con-
tracts in relation thereto."' 5
Broadening Concept of Liberty. Thus "liberty of contract"
was brought within the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. For the first time, the Court had now held that that
liberty meant something more than freedom from physical re-
straint. However insecure the foundation of "liberty of con-
tract" then was, it became buttressed and established beyond
dispute by succeeding cases. 6 The full expanse of the new right
43. Id. at 692-693.
44. 165 U. S. 578.
45. Id. at 591.
46. Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U. S. 45; Coppage v. Kansas (1915)
286 U. S. 1. See also McLean v. Arkansas (1909) 211 U. S. 539; Chicago
B. & Q. Ry. v. McGuire (1911) 219 U. S. 549. In three cases very shortly
following Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U. S. 578, the Court expressed
it approval of the new doctrine. See Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169 U. S.
866, 391; Williams v. Fears (1900) 179 U. S. 270, 274; Booth v. Illinois(1902) 184 U. S. 425.
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was perhaps not at first realized; but, as violations of it, in
Lockner v. New York, 47 in 1905, the Court struck down a New
York statute limiting hours of employment in bakeries to sixty
a week, and in Coppage v. Kansas,48 in 1915, a Kansas statute
prohibiting employers from requiring employees to agree not to
join a labor union, as a condition of employment. And in 1908,
in Adair v. United States,4 the Court held unconstitutional an
act of Congress prohibiting interstate carriers from discharging
employees because of membership in a labor union, upon the
ground that it invaded the liberty of contract which was in-
cluded in the "personal liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment. The rights which were held to be invaded by these statutes
might perhaps have been afforded protection more reasonably
as property than as liberty,50 but in each case the Court was care-
ful to describe the right as "liberty."5' 1 In all three cases there
were dissents (notably by Mr. Justice Holmes), but not upon
the ground that the right in question was not included in the
"liberty" guaranteed by the Amendment.
Also resting on Allgeyer v. Louisiana52 for support was Adams
v. Tanner,53 where the Court held that a Washington statute
prohibiting the charging of fees by employment agencies was an
unconstitutional restriction of the "liberty * * * guaranteed by
the 14th Amendment, to engage in a useful business."
It was not until after Lockner v. New York5 that the claim
was made that freedom of expression, or any of the other rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, were included in the "liberty"
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The due process clause
was identical in the Fourteenth and in the Fifth Amendments,
and it had early been suggested that in the latter "liberty" could
hardly be interpreted as embracing such rights, because of their
47. 198 U. S. 45. The Court said (at 56): "Of course the liberty of
contract relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much
right to purchase as the other to sell labor."
48. 236 U. S. 1.
49. 208 U. S. 161.
50. Cf. Warren, supra note 4, at 449.
51. In Adair v. United States (1908) 208 U. S. 161 and in Coppage v.
Kansas (1915) 236 U. S. 1 the Court said that the right was also entitled
to protection as a property right.
52. (1897) 165 U. S. 578.
53. (1917) 244 U. S. 590, 597. Cf. Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U. S.
33 (equal protection of the laws).
54. (1905) 198 U. S. 45.
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specific guarantee (unqualified by "without due process of
law")55 in the other Amendments contained in the Bill of
Rights.56 But when in 1907 the contention was advanced on
behalf of freedom of the press, in Patterson v. Colorado,7 Mr.
Justice Holmes, as noted above, said simply that the Court left
it undecided. However, Mr. Justice Harlan, whose dissent here
upon the privileges and immunities point has been referred to
above, went on to say:
I go further and hold that the privileges of free speech
and of a free press, belonging to every citizen of the United
States, constitute essential parts of every man's liberty, and
are protected against violation by that clause of the 14th
Amendment forbidding a state to deprive any person of his
liberty without due process of law. It is, I think, impossible
to conceive of liberty, as secured by the Constitution against
hostile action, whether by the nation or by the states, which
does not embrace the right to enjoy free speech and the right
to have a free press.58
55. See note 36, supra.
56. In 1891. Shattuck, supra note 37, at 381.
57. 205 U. S. 454.
58. Id. at 465. Since the state constitutions as a rule contained an
express guarantee of freedom of speech equivalent to that of the First
Amendment, as well as a due process clause equivalent to that of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the question of the inclusion of freedom of speech
within "liberty" was hardly required to be decided by the state courts.
Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Missouri had, twelve years earlier,
expressed the view that freedom of speech was embraced in the liberty
"guaranteed by the 14th Amendment as well as by Section 30, Article 2 of
the Constitution of Missouri." State v. Julow (1895) 129 Mo. 163, 172-173,
81 S. W. 781, 29 L. R. A. 257. Here the court, through Judge Sherwood,
said: "These terms, 'life,' 'liberty,' and 'property,' are representative terms
and cover every right to which a member of the body politic is entitled
under the law. Within their comprehensive scope are embraced the right
of self-defense, freedom of speech, religious and political freedom, exemp-
tion from arbitrary arrests, the right to buy and sell as others may-all
our liberties--personal, civil, and political; in short, all that makes life
worth living; and of none of these liberties can anyone be deprived,
except by due process of law." And in Marx & Haas Clothing Co. v. Watson
(1902) 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391, 394, the court, again through Judge
Sherwood, after referring to the guaranty of freedom of speech contained
in Section 14 of Article 2 of the Missouri Constitution, said: "Nor is it to
be forgotten that the right of free speech is also impliedly guaranteed in
another section of the Bill of Rights, Section 30, to-wit: 'That no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'
In other words, free speech is as an inevitable concomitant and adjuvant
of personal liberty, as necessary to the latter's existence, as vital air to
the lungs, or locomotion to the body."
It is worth noting that the dictum in State v. Julow, supra, was made
following the holding unconstitutional of a Missouri statute prohibiting
employers from contracting with, or compelling, employees to withdraw
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Mr. Justice Harlan had no later occasion to elaborate this bold
statement, but in two dissenting opinions in the following year
he developed his view of the scope of "liberty," as including other
rights. In Berea College v. Kentucky,0 9 dealing with a statute
prohibiting the teaching of white and negro pupils in the same
school, he said: 'But even if such right [the right to impart
instruction] be not strictly a property right, it is, beyond ques-
tion, part of one's liberty, as guaranteed against hostile State
action by the Constitution of the United States * * * the right
to enjoy one's religious belief, unmolested by any human power,
is no more sacred nor more fully or distinctly recognized than
is the right to impart and receive instruction not harmful to the
public. The denial of either right would be an infringement of
the liberty * * **,,60 And in Twining v. New Jersey,0 1 after saying
that the privilege against self-incrimination was within the pro-
tection of the privileges and immunities clause, 2 he added that
it was also "a part of the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amend-
ment against hostile State action."' 3 When, in 1915, " in Fox v.
Washington,65 it was expressly urged that freedom of the press
was within the liberty protected by the due process clause, the
Court was able to dispose of the case by a unanimous opinion,
without consideration of the point.
Freedom of Speech as Liberty-Prelude to Gitlow v. New
York. In 1920 with these decisions and dissents as its back-
ground Gilbert v. Minnesotarr came before the Court. Gilbert,
during the first World War, had vigorously denounced American
participation in the war. The Court affirmed his conviction under
a state statute prohibiting advocacy or teaching which interfered
from or refrain from joining a labor union, substantially similar to the
Kansas statute which was struck down in Coppage v. Kansas (1915) 236
U. S. 1. In Marx & Haas Clothing Co. v. Watson, supra, the statement
came in connection with the holding that an injunction against the dis-
tribution of circulars by a boycotting labor union was a violation of the
freedom of expression guaranteed by Section 14, Article 2, and also, as the
court said, by Section 30.
59. (1908) 211 U. S. 45.
60. Id. at 67-68.
61. (1908) 211 U. S. 78.
62. See note 27, supra.
63. (1908) 211 U. S. 78, 121.
64. Mr. Justice Harlan died in 1911.
65. 236 U. S. 273. This dealt with a nudist publication, which, as the
Court found, advocated disregard of laws against indecent exposure, and
thus violated a state statute prohibiting publications which encouraged the
commission of crime or disrespect for law.
66. 254 U. S. 325.
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with or discouraged enlistment in the military or naval service,
but again, as in Patterson v. Colorado,67 it passed over the ques-
tion of the protection of freedom of speech by the Fourteenth
Amendment, saying: "But without so deciding, or considering
the freedom asserted, as guaranteed or secured * * * by the
Constitution of the United States * * *, we pass immediately
to the contention, and for the purpose of this case may concede
it; that is, concede that the asserted freedom is natural and in-
herent, but it is not absolute,-it is subject to restriction and
limitation. '' 68 Mr. Justice Brandeis, who had become a member
of the court in 1916, dissented in a famous passage:
As the Minnesota statute is, in my opinion, invalid, be-
cause it interferes with Federal functions and with the right
of a citizen of the United States to discuss them, I see no
occasion to consider whether it violates also the 14th Amend-
ment. But I have difficulty in believing that the liberty guar-
anteed by the Constitution, which has been held to protect
against state denial the right of an employer to discriminate
against a workman because he is a member of a trade union
(Coppage v. Kansas), the right of a business man to conduct
a private employment agency (Adams v. Tanner), or to con-
tract outide the state for insurance of his property (AlU-
geyer v. Louisiana), although the legislature deems it inimi-
cal to the public welfare, does not include liberty to teach,
either in the privacy of the home or publicly, the doctrine
of pacifism; so long, at least, as Congress has not declared
that the public safety demands its suppression. I cannot be-
lieve that the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment
includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property 69
The corrosive force of this lay in the contrast between the
expansion of liberty so as to strike down, as violations of liberty
of contract, the social legislation of Coppage v. KansasT and
similar cases, and the failure to make an expansion, certainly
no greater, to protect freedom of speech. It was true that the
Court had never yet refused to take the latter step, but this was
the third time that, offered an opportunity to do so, it had avoided
the issue. Mr. Justice Brandeis' attack was perhaps premised
upon the results reached in the liberty of contract cases, 7t as
67. (1907) 205 U. S. 454.
68. 245 U. S. 325, 332. Cf. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States
(1941) 294-295.
69. 254 U. S. 325, 343.
70. (1915) 236 U. S. 1.
71. He had dissented in Adams v. Tanner (1917) 244 U. S. 590.
Washington University Open Scholarship
512 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
well as upon the failure to protect freedom of speech; and the
Court might conceivably have met him by repudiating these
extreme results, or even by narrowing liberty to its historical
limit of freedom from bodily restraint. But, apart from the
social and economic views held by the Court's majority, to take
this course would have necessitated overruling a great body of
law which had now been built up, not only in the federal courts
but in the state courts. Certainly the protection of freedom of
speech required the overruling of no earlier decision; and the
very care with which decision had been avoided would seem to
indicate that the Court had been a little shaken by Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissent in Patterson v. Colorado.7 2 The contrast, having
now been bluntly pointed out, could not be long ignored, and
Gitlow v. New York7 3 thus became inevitable1
4
True, two years later, in Prudential Insurance Company v.
Cheek,75 the Court, through Mr. Justice Pitney, said: "* * * the
Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states no
obligation to confer upon those within their jurisdiction either
the right of free speech or the right of silence * * *. As we have
stated, neither the 14th Amendment nor any other provision of
the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states any
restriction about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence.'"
But this dictum was merely an impatient exclamation," and
72. (1907) 305 U. S. 454.
73. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
74. Id. at 672, for Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent: "The general principle of
free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the 14th Amend-
ment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there
used." See also Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U. S. 697, 707, where the
Court through Chief Justice Hughes, referring to Gitlow v. New York,
said, "It has been found impossible" to conclude that freedom of speech and
of the press, "this essential personal liberty of the citizen," was not within
the liberty safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. State v. Julow
(1895) 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781 (note 58, supra), where the freedom of
speech dictum was made in a decision that social legislation of the Coppage
v. Kansas type was unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty of contract
-as if to balance the holding. Also cf. Shattuck (writing before Allgeyer
v. Louisiana), supra note 37, at 392.
75. (1922) 259 U. S. 530, 538, 543, 27 A. L. R. 27, 34, 36. Here the
Missouri service letter statute (now R. S. Mo. 1939 §5064) was held
constitutional. The Missouri Supreme Court had held it violated neither
the right of free speech guaranteed by the state constitution nor the liberty
of contract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cheek v. Prudential
Insurance Co. (1916) (not officially reported), 192 S. W. 387, L. R. A. 1918
A 166. In the United States Supreme Court no contention with respect to
freedom of speech was made, but the liberty of contract point was still
pressed.
76. He was referring to the decisions of three state courts that similar
statutes violated the freedom of speech guaranteed by state constitutions.
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Mr. Justice Brandeis did not even trouble to record his disagree-
ment. That the Court was moving to the inevitable conclusion
was indicated by Meyer v. Nebras ka,77 where it held that a state
statute prohibiting the teaching of any language other than
English in the first eight grades of school was an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty ;78 and by Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 9
in 1925, where the Court said, by way of dictum, that an Oregon
statute requiring all children from the age of eight to sixteen
years to attend public schools, violated the liberty of parents to
direct the upbringing and education of their children.
Gitlow v. New York. One week after this case the Court de-
cided Gitlow v. New York,"' which it had had under consideration
for more than two years.-1 Gitlow had taken part in the publica-
tion of a "Left-Wing Manifesto," and had thereafter been con-
victed under a New York statute prohibiting the advocacy of
criminal anarchy. The Court's assumption that freedom of
speech and of the press "are among the fundamental personal
rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause" pre-
ceded its holding that nevertheless a state might punish those
who abused the freedom by utterances which "imperil its own
existence as a constitutional state," and that the New York
statute here was not an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of
the state's police power.8 2 The "For present purposes we may
and do assume" was not much more than an affirmative phrasing
of the "We leave undecided" of Patterson v. Coloradol' and the
Wallace v. Georgia C. & N. Ry. (1893) 94 Ga. 732, 22 S. E. 579; Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry. v. Brown (1909) 80 Kan. 312, 102 Pac. 459, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 247; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Griffin (1914) 106 Tex. 477, 171 S. W.
703, L. R. A. 1917 B 1108.
77. (1923) 262 U. S. 390. Note especially the broad language of Mr.
Justice McReynolds' opinion, at 399: "While this court has not attempted
to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration, and some of the included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint,
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."
78. At the same time as Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U. S. 390, the
Court decided Bartels v. Iowa (1923) 262 U. S. 404, to the same effect.
79. (1925) 268 U. S. 510, 534-535.
80. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
81. The case was first argued April 12, 1923, was reargued November
23, 1923, and was decided June 8, 1925.
82. Cf. Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 318-325.
83. (1907) 205 U. S. 454.
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"But without so deciding * * * we * * * for the purpose of this
case may concede" of Gilbert v. Minnesota.84 In each case the
purpose was to demonstrate that no violation of freedom of
expression had occurred, even if the accused was entitled to the
protection afforded by the freedom. Patterson's conviction was
affirmed, Gilbert's conviction was affirmed, and so was Gitlow's.
The Court's consideration of the question was limited to the sen-
tence which has been quoted at the commencement of this article
and to the brief additional statement that it did not "regard the
incidental statement in Prudential Insurance Company v. Cheek
* * * as determinative of this question. ' '85 But actually, as suc-
ceeding cases demonstrated, this was the final victory. Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes (whose well known aversion to restriction of the
powers of the states warred, in these cases, with his attachment
to freedom of speech) acquiesced with equal brevity, and Mr.
Justice Brandeis was content to join in his opinion1 In this
discreet fashion the new liberty arrived.
Thus, with the adventitious aid of the Fourteenth Amendment
and of the broad concept of liberty of contract developed under
it, Madison's view, after a century of struggle, at last prevailed.
The effort to protect the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
by construing the Amendments as in themselves restrictions
upon the states had failed; the effort to protect them by means
of the privileges or immunities clause had been on the whole
unsuccessful; but protection for freedom of speech and of the
press had finally been won, as "liberty" under the due process
clause.
II. THE NEW LIBERTY
A. Establishment
The new concept was not warmly welcomed2 T For one thing,
the importance of the victory, or indeed that victory had been
84. (1920) 254 U. S. 325.
85. (1925) 268 U. S. 652, 666.
86. Mr. Justice Holmes' language is given in note 74, supra. He dis-
sented upon the ground that the clear and present danger rule should have
been applied to the facts.
87. The most discerning contemporary comment was highly critical. See
Warren, supra note 4. Comment in (1925) 14 Cal. L. Rev. 54, (1925) 25
Col. L. Rev. 966, and (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 108, made no reference to the
enlargement of "liberty," dealing only with the clear and present danger
point. Comment in (1925) 20 Ill. L. Rev. 399, (1925) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 187,
and (1925) 4 Neb. L. Bull. 166, also dealt chiefly with clear and present
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won at all, was hardly apparent from the Court's opinion, and
for another it was utterly overshadowed by the clear and present
danger point upon which Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented.
It was six years before it became apparent that Gitlow v. New
York88 was to be taken as firmly establishing the new rule. In
1927 the question was again before the Court in Whitney v.
California,8' and in Fiske v. Kansas,90 but the majority opinions,
(by Mr. Justice Sanford in both cases)91 took the protection of
freedom of speech by the Fourteenth Amendment for granted,
and did not discuss it.92 Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion
in Whibney v. California93 is, however, to be noted, as is also
the fact that Fiske v. Kansas94 was the first successful invocation
of freedom of speech in the Supreme Court. But in 1931 it be-
came clear that the liberty had been established. In Stromberg
v. California5 the Court, through Chief Justice Hughes, reversed
danger, and regarded the enlargement of liberty as not yet established, but
as something that the Court had assumed, without so holding. The same
view was taken in (1927) 14 Va. L. Rev. 49. For a subsequent reply to
Warren, see (1926) 20 Ill. L. Rev. 809. Cf. Frankfurter, A Study in the
Federal Judiciary System (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 1046, 1050-1051 (citing
Warren).
88. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
89. 274 U. S. 357.
90. 274 U. S. 380.
91. Mr. Justice Sanford had written the opinion in Gitlow v. New York
(1925) 268 U. S. 652.
92. In Whitney v. California (1927) 274 U. S. 357, 371, the conviction of
Anita Whitney under the California Syndicalism Act, for organizing, being
a member of, and assembling with the Communist Labor Party, was affirmed,
the Court saying that "the freedom of speech which is secured by the Con-
stitution does not confer an absolute right to speak" and that the act was
not an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the state's police power, "un-
warrantably infringing any right of free speech, assembly or association."
In Fiske v. Kansas (1927) 274 U. S. 380, 387, a conviction under a similar
Kansas statute was reversed, because the Court found that the printed
matter which defendant had circulated lacked the advocacy of crime, vio-
lence or unlawful methods which had been present in the Gitlow case, and
that the statute, as thus applied, unwarrantably infringed the defendant's
liberty "in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment." For
comment on Whitney v. California, supra, see Powell, The Supreme Court
and State Police Power, 1922-1930 (1932) 57, 74 (reprinted from 17-18
Va. L. Rev.); Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 343; note (1927) 14 Va.
L. Rev. 49.
93. (1927) 274 U. S. 357. He said (at 373): "Despite arguments to the
contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due
grocess clause of the 14th Amendment applies to matters of substantive
w as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights com-
prised within the term 'liberty' are protected by the Federal Constitution
rom invasion by the states. The right of free speech, the right to teach,
and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights."
94. (1927) 274 U. S. 380.
95. 283 U. S. 359.
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a conviction under the California Red Flag law, holding that the
law was "repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the
14th Amendment." As to this guaranty the Court spoke with
finality: "It has been determined that the conception of liberty
under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment embraces
the right of free speech." 96 Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting, pro-
tested that the Court was not "called on to decide" the question ;,
but when, a month later, Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minne-
sotfl 98 said, "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the
press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment from invasion by State
action," 99 Mr. Justice Butler agreed, saying "That question has
been finally answered in the affirmative." 00 The decisions of the
ten years since have fully confirmed this. As Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said, at the 1941-1942 term of Court, in Bridges v. Cali-
fornia:
In a series of opinions as uncompromising as any in its
history, this Court has settled that the fullest opportunities
for free discussion are "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment," pro-
tected against attempted invasion by the States.01
B. Scope of the New Liberty
The scope of the liberty' 012 so protected has, with succeeding
cases, become to some extent defined. Gitlow v. New York1°3 had
referred only to freedom of speech and of the press, but Mr.
Charles Warren had promptly observed that if this was to be
included within liberty, then other rights guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights had at least an equal claim to inclusion.04 He argued
96. Id. at 368. The Gitlow, Whitney, and Fiske cases were the authorities
cited for this.
97. (1931) 283 U. S. 359, 376. He added: "Cf. Prudential Insurance Co.
v. Cheek" (1922) 259 U. S. 530, 27 A. L. R. 27, and the three later cases.
98. (1931) 283 U. S. 697, 707, 723-724. For comment on this, see Chafee,
op. cit. supra, note 68, at 375.
99. (1931) 283 U. S. 697, 707.
100. Id. at 723.
101. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190, 203.
102. It may be noted that the word "liberty" is nowhere used in the Bill
of Rights (aside from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment),
that "freedom" appears only in "freedom of speech" in the First Amend-
ment, and that "free" appears only in the First Amendment ("free exercise"
of religion) and in the Second ("a free State").
103. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
104. Warren, supra note 4, 458-461. Cf. Shattuck, supra note 37, at 392.
See also Powell, op. cit. supra, note 92 at 52: "It is no longer worth while
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that historically freedom of speech was not as "fundamental" as
most of the other rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, since,
prior to the First Amendment, "while no State had in its Bill
of Rights a declaration of right to freedom of speech, practically
every State had a declaration of right to freedom of religion, of
right to keep and bear arms, of right to be free from unreason-
able search and seizure, and of right to jury trial."'0 5
Religious Freedom. But as the matter has so far developed,
the Court, while by no means confining the protection to freedom
of speech and of the press, has taken a different view. The First
Amendment protects three rights from abridgment by the Fed-
eral Government: religious freedom, 10 6 freedom of speech and of
the press, and the right of peaceable assembly. If the contem-
porary evaluation of the relative importance of these liberties is
to be determined by the order in which they are enumerated in
the Bill of Rights, then it is to be observed that freedom of re-
ligion was placed first, ahead even of freedom of speech. Even
before Gitlow v. New York'07 the inclusion of religious freedom
within the liberty protected by the due process clause had had
the support of the broad language of Mr. Justice Harlan's dis-
senting opinion in Berea College v. Kentucky ,"s and of the
dictum in Meyer v. Nebraska;0 1 and no more than this has often
enough been regarded as respectable authority for the enuncia-
tion of constitutional principles in this field. The inclusion of
the closely allied right of freedom of expression in the concept of
liberty had now been established beyond dispute. Yet the Court,
in spite of these considerations, proceeded with a curious caution
when it came to the protection of religious freedom. In Hamilton
v. University of California-9 a California statute requiring all
students at the state university to take a course in military
science and tactics was attacked, on behalf of students who held,
to spend time in considering whether there are liberties not within the
assumed contemplation of the official progenitors of the 14th Amendment."
Cf. also Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Twining v. New Jersey (1908) 211
U. S. 78, supra note 27, dealing with the privileges and immunities clause.
105. Id. at 461.
106. The exact language as to this is: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."
107. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
108. (1908) 211 U. S. 45.
109. (1923) 262 U. S. 390, supra note 77.
110. (1934) 293 U. S. 245.
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as a part of their religioms belief, that military training was
immoral and contrary to the precepts of Christianity."" It was
urged that this requirement deprived them of the religious
liberty safeguarded by the due process clause.1 2 The Court,
while it said that the liberty protected by the due process clause
undoubtedly "does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to
adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines"1 13 on which
these students based their objections to compulsory military
training,"1' held that they were not deprived of this liberty by
the statute. Mr. Justice Cardozo, concurring, said: "I assume
for present purposes that the religious liberty protected by the
First Amendment against invasion by the nation is protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by the states."15
In this restrained expression, oddly like the language used in
Gitlow v. New York, 1 6 Justices Brandeis and Stone concurred.
In 1937 Mr. Justice Sutherland, dissenting, in a case where
invasion by the Federal Government of freedom of speech and of
the press was claimed, remarked: "'Liberty' is a word of wide
meaning, and, without more, would have included the various
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment." 17 A little later,
in Palko v. Connecticut,"" the Court, through Mr. Justice Car-
dozo, said, as dictura, that "the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment may make it unlawful for a state to abridge
by its statutes * * * the free exercise of religion * * *." In
1938, in Lovell v. Griffin,-, the distribution of religious tracts
regarding the gospel of the "Kingdom of Jehovah," without the
license which a city ordinance required (the distributor believ-
ing that application for a license was forbidden by Jehovah's
commandment), was claimed to be protected by the clause, both
111. They were members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, which had
previously protested against the requirement on several occasions.
112. It was also urged that it violated the privileges and immunities
clause. See note 34, supra.
113. Hamilton v. University of California (1934) 293 U. S. 245, 262.
114. As authority for this the Court cited Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262
U. S. 390, Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U. S. 510, Stromberg v.
California (1931) 283 U. S. 359, and Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U. S.
697. The last three of these cases had not even indulged in dicta with
reference to religious freedom.
115. (1934) 293 U. S. 245, 265.
116. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
117. Associated Press v. N. L. R. B. (1937) 301 U. S. 103, 134.
118. (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 324.
119. (1938) 303 U. S. 444.
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as an exercise of religious freedom and of the freedom of the
press; but the Court, holding the ordinance invalid as an invasion
of freedom of the press, did not consider the question of religious
freedom. In like manner, in Schneider v. Irvington,120 where the
enforcement against a number of Jehovah's Witnesses of an
ordinance prohibiting the unlicensed distribution of circulars,
was claimed to violate both religious liberty and freedom of ex-
pression, the Court held that the ordinance was a deprivation of
freedom of speech and of the press, but said nothing with regard
to the invasion of religious liberty.
It was not until 1940 that the question was actually decided.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut,1'2 a statute prohibiting the unlicensed
solicitation of funds for religious causes was attacked by mem-
bers of Jehovah's Witnesses who had engaged in such solicitation
on a New Haven street. The attack was again based upon in-
vasion both of religious freedom and of freedom of expression.
The Court was now ready to deal squarely with the question. It
held that the statute, as here construed and applied, amounted
to a censorship of religion, and was a deprivation of the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Through Mr. Justice
Roberts, the Court said:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment * * * Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. * * *
the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature
of things, the second cannot be.- 2
Two weeks later, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis 123
a school board regulation requiring all children to participate in
saluting the flag and in reciting a pledge of allegiance, was held
not to be a deprivation of religious liberty, in the case of children
(affiliated with Jehovah's Witnesses) who, as the Court found,
refused to participate, in the conscientious belief that this was
forbidden by command of scripture. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
120. (1939) 308 U. S, 147.
121. 310 U. S. 296, 128 A. L. R. 1352. For comment on this see Chafee,
op. cit. supra, note 68 at 404. Cf. Ex parte Williams (1940) 345 Mo. 1121,
189 S. W. (2d) 485.
122. (1940) 310 U. S. 296, 303.
128. (1940) 310 U. S. 586.
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speaking for the Court, said that the religious liberty protected
by the Constitution had never excluded legislation of general
scope, not directed against doctrinal loyalties or particular sects;
but he emphatically reaffirmed the inclusion of religious freedom
in the protection of the due process clause. In two recent cases
involving Jehovah's Witnesses, Cox v. New Hampshire,'24 and
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,125 the Court has held that statutes
(to which the New Hampshire court had given a limited con-
struction) requiring a license for a parade in a public street,
and prohibiting addressing persons on a public street derisively
or offensively, do not invade religious freedom, but inclusion of
this freedom within the "liberty" of the due process clause was,
in the latter case, carefully affirmed.
The "equal rights of conscience" which Madison had sought
to protect against state abridgment have thus finally attained
protection (at least to the extent of freedom from censorship),
by virtue of Cantwell v. Connecticut,'l2 which remains the only
holding-the only instance in which the protection has actually
bee a given. The Court's slow progress to this result, commenc-
ing with the dictum in the Hamilton case, supra, (to which three
justices agreed only as an assumption for the purposes of the
case), and followed by its avoidance of consideration of the ques-
tion, in Lovell v. Griffin12 7 and Schneider v. Irvington,128 is
reminiscent of the manner in which freedom of speech was
brought within the concept of liberty. No one expects the Court
to function as rapidly as a constitutional convention, but still one
might have thought that, freedom of expression having been
recognized to be an essential part of liberty, the inclusion of
religious freedom would have presented no great difficulty. It
may be suggested that the Lovel and Schneider cases indicate
no more than the reluctance to decide a question until it has to
be decided, which usually is the part of wisdom; but, on the
whole, it must be said that in none of these cases has the Court
(with the exception of Mr. Justice Stone) as yet displayed the
burning zeal to protect the freedom, which it had earlier shown
in dealing with freedom of speech and of the press.
124. (1941) 312 U. S. 569.
125. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 766.
126. (1940) 310 U. S. 296. See note 121 supra.
127. (1938) 303 U. S. 444.
128. (1939) 308 U. S. 147.
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Of the seven cases in which protection for the free exercise
of religion has been sought, the Court in four has held that the
state action complained of was not an invasion of the freedom.
While the two New Hampshire cases may be explained by the
limited construction placed upon the statutes, the other two cases
are worth examination. Hamilton v. University of CaliforniA12
and Minersville School District v. Gobitis"30 are essentially simi-
lar, although the latter includes one element not present in the
former case. In each a requirement of general application di-
rected against no particular sect-in the one case military train-
ing, in the other the flag salute and pledge of allegiance-did
violence to the religious beliefs of some of the students to whom
it was applied. In neither case does the Court appear to have
given too much recognition to the fact that "the free exercise
of" religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, by its very
nature imperatively requires the translation of the religious be-
lief into action or non-action. In both of these cases the belief
required non-action; in neither did this non-action directly in-
fringe upon the rights of any other person. The consideration
to be balanced against the abridgment of freedom of religion was,
therefore, (aside from one of limited force, that discipline might
be impaired if the requirements were not universally enforced),
simply the advantage to be gained by compelling a few students
to receive military education and by compelling a few children to
salute the flag and recite a pledge of allegiance. The interests
of the state which might thus be served seem too slight to justify
the abridgment. Hamilton, with his conscientious belief that
military training was immoral and contrary to Christianity, is
not likely to have distinguished himself in the course when com-
pelled to take it, nor are the Gobitis children likely to have de-
veloped patriotism by being forced to engage in a daily salute
and recital. And, as Mr. Justice Stone observed in the Gobitis
case, "there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism."'
31
The fact that in the Hamilton and Gobitis cases the restrictions
129. (1934) 293 U. S. 245.
130. (1940) 310 U. S. 586.
131. Id. at 603. In Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147, six
months earlier, the Court had indicated that the existence of other non-
abridging means of attaining the end sought by the state might be sufficient
to deprive the state of power to resort to a means which abridged freedom
of speech and of the press.
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were non-discriminatory, and applied to all religious sects alike,
is not of so much consequence, for any restriction may be in
terms non-discriminatory, but actually a discrimination against
a single sect whose beliefs or activities are in conflict with it.
If these decisions are to be supported at all, it seems that they
might better have been placed upon the ground that, since under
Pierce v. Society of Sisters"- the attendance of the students at
the University of California and of the children at the public
schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, could not have been com-
pelled, they might have avoided the requirement by going else-
where; although this is open to the objection that in actual fact
it might have been impossible for them to have obtained an
equivalent education elsewhere.
In addition, it should be noted that the Gobitis decision in-
volved something which was not present in the Hamilton case-
a compulsion to express a belief, even though the expression
violated religious convictions. As to that, Mr. Justice Stone,
dissenting, observed that "the very essence of the liberty" which
is guaranteed "is the freedom of the individual from compulsion
as to what he shall think and what he shall say, at least where the
compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion. '13 He con-
sidered that if the guaranty of freedom of religion was to have
any meaning it must be "deemed to withhold from the state any
authority to compel belief or the expression of it where that
expression violates religious convictions, whatever may be the
legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion."'3 In
this aspect, the right here involved would appear to be another
and more sharply cut facet of what Mr. Justice Pitney, in Pru-
dential Insurance Company v. Cheek,135 had referred to as the
"liberty of silence."
One is struck by the fact that in the religious freedom cases
Jehovah's Witnesses appear to be cast for the role played by
Communists in the early case dealing with freedom of speech.
But the Court has not displayed the same acute concern for them,
nor the same emotional attachment to the freedom. In Cantwell
v. Connecticut36 there was measured and capable intellectual
132. (1925) 268 U. S. 510.
133. (1940) 310 U. S. 586, 604.
134. Ibid.
135. (1922) 259 U. S. 530. See notes 75 and 76 supra.
136. (1940) 310 U. S. 296.
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consideration; but that was a simple enough case, once the Court
took the view that the power to grant or withhold a license was
discretionary. In the Gobitis case Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems
to be approximately at the same point where Mr. Justice Roberts
was in the Cantwell case. It is significant that there has been no
suggestion that the clear and present danger rule 37 is to be ap-
plied to the abridgment of religious freedom,138 although, since
Herndon v. Lowry, 39 that has been taken as the measuring rod
for permissible limitation of freedom of expression, to the great
advantage of that freedom. However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dictum in Minersville School District v. Gobitis140 that "because
in safeguarding conscience we are dealing with interests so
subtle and so dear, every possible leeway should be given to the
claims of religious faith"''-an expression to which too much
weight was not given in the decision of the case, but which is
nevertheless destined often to be quoted to the Court-together
with Mr. Justice Stone's expression in the same case, that legis-
lation repressing religious freedom "must at least be subject to
the same judicial scrutiny as legislation which we have recently
held to infringe the constitutional liberty of religious and racial
minorities, '2 12 may in time become the foundation for some-
thing approaching the clear and present danger test, or at least
for a more careful examination of deprivations of religious free-
dom.1,3
137. Discussed infra under TI.
138. In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296, it was not applied
to the licensing statute, but it was applied to the count which charged in-
citing a breach of the peace. The conviction on the latter count was re-
versed primarily on the ground that it invaded freedom of speech, although
the Court mentioned religious freedom incidentally.
139. (1937) 301 U. S. 242.
140. (1940) 310 U. S. 586.
141. Id. at 594. Read in its context, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's expres-
sion appears to spring from intellectual appraisal rather than from emo-
tional attachment. In Bridges v. California (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190, 203,
dissenting, he remarked that "judges are restrained in their freedom of
expression by historic compulsions resting on no other officials of govern-
ment," and in his address at the Amherst College Conmencement, June,
1940 (43 Harv. Alumni Bulletin 84), he said: "I suppose an unconscious
reason for the attachment of judges to freedom of speech is that they have
so little of it." This has a core of literal truth. Of course judges have
never been restrained in the free exercise of religion.
142. (1940) 310 U. S. 586, 607.
143. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Gobitis case, id. at 595: "Nor
does the freedom of speech assured by due process move in a more absolute
circle of immunity than that enjoyed by religious freedom."
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From the point of view of development of the freedom, it is
unfortunate that the exercise of religion is, now at least, pos-
sessed of no economic implications and of few political ones. It
is idle to speculate on the development which might ensue were
organized labor to evolve a religion of its own-preferably an
eccentric one. But as it is, it is evident that Jehovah's Witnesses
are serving a useful purpose. No instrumentality of state gov-
ernment is likely to abuse the religious freedom of well-estab-
lished churches, such as the Episcopalian, Catholic, Presbyterian,
Jewish, or Baptist; and the HamiIton case, which dealt with
Methodists, is exceptional. A new sect, entertaining, as Mr.
Justice Stone described it in the Gobitis case, "a religious belief,
which is such a departure from the usual course of human con-
duct, that most persons are disposed to regard it with little
toleration or concern,"'1 is much more likely to run afoul of the
law. The beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses, precisely because they
run counter to those of the great majority, may very well per-
form a constitutional service by accelerating the frequency with
which the Court is obliged to consider religious liberty, and thus
compelling more rapid development of the full extent of the
freedom.
Recent Developments in Religious Freedom. Since the preced-
ing paragraphs were written emphasis has been added to them
by Jones v. Opelika,1 5 the last decision of the 1941-1942 term.
In this 5-to-4 decision the Court affirmed the convictions of mem-
bers of Jehovah's Witnesses, under ordinances of Opelika, Ala-
bama, Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Casa Grande, Arizona, for
distributing religious literature without a license. The ordinances
required the payment of flat license fees, in amounts which, as
applied to the operations of this sect, were in effect prohibitive.1 0
The distributors were ministers who went through the streets
and from house to house in the usual way, playing phonograph
records, offering religious pamphlets and books for sale at a
nominal price (two for five cents for the pamphlets, twenty-five
144. (1940) 310 U. S. 586, 606.
145. 62 S. Ct. 1231.
146. The ordinances applied in terms to book agents, peddlers, and
itinerant salesmen of all sorts. The Opelika ordinance required payment of
a 50-cent "issuance fee," plus $10 a year for book agents, and $5 a year for
transient distributors; the Fort Smith tax was $2.50 a day, $10 a week, or
$25 a month; and the Casa Grande tax was $25 a quarter (in a town of less
than 1000 adults).
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cents for the books), but giving them away in some cases where
the recipient was unable or unwilling to pay. The Court, through
Mr. Justice Reed, held that the ordinances as here applied did
not abridge either freedom of the press or the free exercise of
religion. It indulged religious freedom to the extent of some
kind words, but said that the taxes were general and non-
discriminatory,1 47 and firmly shut its eyes to their prohibitive
amount. In order to uphold the ordinances, the Court was obliged
to regard them as regulatory, although the state courts had con-
sidered them to be revenue measures, and although when applied
to Jehovah's Witnesses they became prohibitive. It was obliged
also to regard Jehovah's Witnesses as subjected only to "a rea-
sonable fee for their money-making activities," and to view the
sales of literature "as partaking more of commercial than of
religious or educational transactions," although the funds col-
lected were used for the support of the church, and no one de-
rived a profit from either the publication or the distribution of
the literature. The Opelika ordinance, in addition, provided
discretionary power to revoke the license (without refund of the
fee paid) ; but the Court was able, by a heroic effort, to reconcile
this with Cantwell v. Connectiut.'48
As observed above, a defense (although I think not a valid
one) may be made for the results of the Hamilton and Gobitis
cases; but for Jones v. OpelikaA49 there is nothing to be said.
There was nothing to be balanced against the freedom except
the tax revenue, which, even if it were a proper object to be
placed in the scales,:1 0 was here non-existent, because the taxes
were greater than could have been paid. Nevertheless Jones v.
Opeika, supra, in the long run will mark an advance for the
liberty, because of the dissenting opinions. With Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Stone now stand Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy. All
four concurred in the separate dissenting opinions of the Chief
Justice and of Mr. Justice Murphy, which seem calculated to
have a profound effect in the development of the freedom. The
147. In view of the Court's reliance in the Hamilton, Gobitis, and Jones
cases, on the "non-discriminatory" character of the state action, it would
seem worth while to demolish this point, once for all, in the next case that
arises.
148. (1940) 310 U. S. 296.
149. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1231.
150. The four dissenting justices considered that it was not.
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Chief Justice, after commenting on the "questions which have
been studiously left unanswered" by the majority opinion, and
pointing out that a flat tax of this kind, if applied to interstate
commerce, would be an unconstitutional burden, said that the
First Amendment was "not confined to safeguarding freedom
of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory at-
tempts to wipe them out," but that, on the contrary, the com,
mands of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
extend at least to every form of taxation which, because
it is a condition of the exercise of the privilege, is capable
of being used to control or suppress it. * * * The taxes are
insupportable either as a tax on the dissemination of ideas
or as a tax on the collection of funds for religious purposes.
For on its face a flat license tax restrains in advance the
freedom taxed and tends inevitably to suppress its exercise.
The First Amendment prohibits all laws abridging freedom
of press and religion, not merely some laws or all except tax
laws. * * * It seems fairly obvious that if the present taxes,
laid in small communities upon peripatetic religious propa-
gandists, are to be sustained, a way has been found for the
effective suppression of speech and press and religion despite
constitutional guaranties. The very taxes now before us are
better adapted to that end than were the stamp taxes which
so successfully curtailed the dissemination of ideas by eight-
eenth century newspapers and pamphleteers, and which were
a moving cause of the American Revolution.51
Mr. Justice Murphy, after observing that "the most tyrannical
government is powerless to control the inward workings of the
mind," but that "even an aggressive mind is of no missionary
value unless there is freedom of action, freedom to communicate
its message to others by speech and writing," said:
Important as free speech and a free press are to a free
government and a free citizenry, there is a right even more
dear to many individuals-the right to worship their Maker
according to their needs and the dictates of their souls and
to carry their message or their gospel to every living crea-
ture. * * *
The mind rebels at the thought that a minister of any of
the old established churches could be made to pay fees to the
community before entering the pulpit. These taxes on peti-
tioners' efforts to preach the "news of the Kingdom" should
be struck down because they burden petitioners' right to
151. Jones v. Opelika (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1231, 1245.
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worship the Deity in their own fashion and to spread the
gospel as they understand it.2
52
And, with a candor which has not been too frequent in this
field, Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy jointly said:
The opinion of the Court sanctions a device which in our
opinion suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of
a religion practiced by a minority group. This is but an-
other step in the direction which Minersville School Distict
v. Gobitis took against the same religious minority and is a
logical extension of the principles upon which that decision
rested. Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case,
we think this is an appropriate occasion to state that we now
believe that it was also wrongly decided 15 3
The Right of Assembly. The third right guaranteed by the
First Amendment is the right "peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." As the
cases illustrate, the right is often so intertwined with the right
of free speech as to be inseparable from it. In 1937, in De Jonge
v. Oregon,-4 the Court reversed a conviction, under the Oregon
Criminal Syndicalism Law, for having assisted in the conduct
of a public meeting called by the Communist party, an organiza-
tion advocating criminal syndicalism. The indictment did not
charge that there was any such advocacy at the meeting. The
Court, through Chief Justice Hughes, reasoning from the de-
cisions which had established freedom of speech and of the press
as within the protection of the due process clause, held that the
right of peaceable assembly, "a right cognate to those of free
speech and free press and * * * equally fundamental," could not
be denied "without violating those fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which * * * the Fourteenth Amendment em-
bodies in the general terms of its due process clause."'155 Three
months later, in Herndon v. Lovry,'" the Court, through Mr.
Justice Roberts, reversed the conviction, under a Georgia statute,
of a Negro Communist, a paid organizer for the party, who had
called and attended public meetings for the purpose of recruiting
members. The Court held that the statute, as here construed and
152. Id. at 4470.
158. Id. at 4468.
154. (1987) 299 U. S. 353. For comment, see Chafee, op. cit. supra, note
68, at 384-888; (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 689.
155. DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) 299 U. S. 353, 364.
156. (1937) 301 U. S. 242, 259.
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applied, "unreasonably limits freedom of speech and freedom
of assembly and violates the Fourteenth Amendment." Still later
in the same year, in Palko v. Connecticut,'17 Mr. Justice Cardozo
included in his catalog of the rights protected by the due process
clause, "the right of peaceable assembly, without which speech
would be unduly trammeled." And in 1939, in Hague v. C. I. O.,. '
the Court again held that "freedom of speech and of assembly"
could not be abridged by state action, the purpose of the assembly
there being to communicate information regarding the National
Labor Relations Act."' 9 The inclusion of the right within "lib-
157. (1937) 302 U. S. 319.
158. 307 U. S. 496.
159. Whether the right guaranteed by this clause of the First Amend-
ment is single, or whether the comma breaks it into two: a right to assemble
for any purpose, and a right to petition for redress of grievances, in an
assembly or out of it-has not always been clear. In United States v.
Cruikshank (1876) 92 U. S. 542, dealing with the privileges and immunities
clause, the Court held that the right was single: a right to assemble "for
the purpose of" petitioning-although it gave to the qualifying phrase the
broader meaning of petitioning Congress not only for a redress of grievances,
but "for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the
National Government." The meetings in DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) 299
U. S. 353, and in Herndon v. Lowry (1937) 301 U. S. 242, would hardly
have met this qualification; but in neither case did the Court mention it.
In Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496, however, the three justices who
held that the right was safeguarded as a "privilege or immunity" (see
note 34, supra) cited this paragraph from United States v. Cruikshank
(1876) 92 U. S. 542, and dwelt upon the fact that the purpose of the meet-
ings was to discuss the National Labor Relations Act. Justices Stone and
Reed, who protected the right as "liberty," considered that the purpose of
the meetings was to organize labor unions, rather than to discuss the Act
of Congress. To say, however, as they did and as Chief Justice Hughes had
earlier said in DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) 299 U. S. 353, that the protection
extends to an assembly for "any lawful purpose," begs the question of what
purposes may by state action be made unlawful. In consideration of Hague
v. C. 1. 0. (1939) 307 U. S. 496, as well as of United States v. Cruikshank
(1876) 92 U. S. 542, it should be noted that the privileges and immunities
clause protects only the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, whereas the due process clause protects liberty without regard to
citizenship, and the First Amendment guarantees "the right of the people
peaceably to assemble." It therefore makes a difference whether the right
is protected as a privilege or immunity, or as liberty.
In Bridges v. California (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190, 201, where a labor leader
had sent a telegram to the Secretary of Labor, denouncing the decree of a
California court and threatening to call a strike, five justices apparently
regarded this as an exercise of "the right to petition to a duly accredited
representative of the United States government, a right protected by the
First Amendment." This recognition of the right of petition, exercised
independently of any assembly, would give the clause what seems to be a
more reasonable meaning, and would free the right of assembly from any
qualification as to the purpose of the assembly. Presumably two rights, each
broad and independent of the other, have now been accorded recognition by
these cases, and included within liberty.
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erty" in these cases followed, naturally and without question,
from the inclusion of freedom of speech.
Right of Counsel. Even before Do Jonge v. Oregon'" and
Cantwell v. Connecticut-ol had completed the inclusion within
liberty of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, the
Court had extended the protection of the due process clause
against invasion by the states, to another right guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama,' -6 2 it held that
the right of the accused in criminal prosecutions "to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense," guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, was protected by the due process clause against
denial by a state court. Here the Court did not speak of the right
as an essential part of liberty, but rather as an essential part of
procedural due process, although in doing so it encountered diffi-
culty with its earlier decision in Hurtado v. California.11 The
Court, however, was careful to base its decision in part upon the
protection of freedom of speech and of the press, which had
then been established by Near v. Minnesota?6 4 and earlier cases;
and it added that "the fact that the right involved is of such a
character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions,'" was one of the compel-
ling considerations in determining whether it was "embraced
within the due process clause of the 14th Amendment." The
Court may have felt that it was difficult to bring this right within
a reasonable definition of liberty; and if it was held to be in-
cluded in "due process," there was no need to make the effort.
But Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement (in Palko v. Connecticut" '
five years later) that in Powell v. Alabam4V16 " the right to counsel
had "been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
160. (1937) 299 U. S. 353.
161. (1940) 310 U. S. 296. See note 121, supra.
162. (1932) 287 U. S. 45. For comment see (1933) 18 ST. Louis LAW
RXvis:w 161.
163. (1884) 110 U. S. 516. The case held that due process of law did not
require an indictment by a grand jury in a murder prosecution, since the
Fifth Amendment had contained, first, an explicit guarantee of this right,
and, second, a due process clause; while the Fourteenth Amendment, the
due process clause of which was to be given the same construction as the
clause in the Fifth Amendment, omitted the explicit requirement of a grand
jury indictment. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.
164. (1931) 283 U. S. 697.
165. (1937) 302 U. S. 319.
166. (1932) 287 U. S. 45.
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was essentially true; and there can be no doubt that the decision
was aided by Gitlow v. New York,.'I T Later cases had accepted
Powell v. AlabanmWa6 without question, 69 although there was no
later holding; but the Court has recently, in Betts v. Brady,10
substantially limited the scope of the right.
Confrontation and Self-incrimination. Two years after Powell
v. Akab~mez" the Court, in Snyder v. Massachusetts'72 dealt in-
conclusively with another right guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment- the right of the accused to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him. But the Court's handling of self-incrimina-
tion has been much more decisive. In 1936, in Brown v. Missis-
167. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
168. (1932) 287 U. S. 45.
169. See Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) 297 U. S. 233, 243-244;
Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 324-325; Avery v. Alabama
(1940) 308 U. S. 444 (which speaks of the "peculiar sacredness" of the
right); Glasser v. United States (1942), 62 S. Ct. 457. (Commented on in
(1942) 27 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 581. Cf. Smith v. O'Grady
(1941) 312 U. S. 329.
170. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1252. Here the trial court had refused to appoint
counsel for an accused, without funds, who had requested such appointment.
The accused thereupon tried his own case, was convicted of robbery and
sentenced to eight years in prison. The Court, through Mr. Justice Roberts,
affirmed the conviction, holding that Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S.
45, had not established the right to such appointment except in a particular
case where a fair trial could not be had without it. It admitted that the
broader right was guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment in federal prosecu-
tions; and indeed the contrast with so recent a decision as Glasser v. United
States (1942) 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 405 (note 169, supra) is shocking.
Upon the facts as stated in the opinion there appears to be no basis for
distinguishing Betts v. Brady supra, and Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287
U. S. 45, except (1) the fact that here the accused was white, there a
Negro, and (2) the severity of the punishment assessed in Powell v. Ala-
bama, supra. Even upon the "fair trial" basis, the decision seems inde-
fensible, in the light of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black (in
which Justices Douglas and Murphy concurred).
The following expression in the dissenting opinion should be noted: "I
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the
states. But this view, although often urged in dissents, has never been
accepted by a majority of this Court and is not accepted today. A statement
of the grounds supporting it is, therefore, unnecessary at this time." Betts
v. Brady, supra, at 1262.
171. (1932) 287 U. S.45.
172. (1934) 291 U. S. 97. The Court, through Mr. Justice Cardozo,
affirmed a conviction for murder, where the accused had been denied the
right to be present at a view to which the jury had been taken, saying
(at 106), with regard to the constitutional right: "For present purposes
we assume that the privilege is reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment,
though this has not been squarely held." But Mr. Justice Roberts, in a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Brandeis, Sutherland, and Butler con-
curred, said (at 131): "'* * * it is not a matter of assumption but a cer-
tainty that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the observance of the
rule."
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s8pi," 7' it reversed a conviction which rested upon a confession
extorted by brutality and violence, holding that the use of such
a confession was a denial of due process. In 1940, in Chambers
v. Florida' 4 it held that use of a confession obtained by question-
ing over a period of five days was a denial of due process. From
that it was but a short step to Lisenba v. California,'7" a case
dealing with the confession of an accomplice, where Mr. Justice
Roberts, speaking for the Court, said, as dictum, that "The
concept of due process would void a trial in which, by threats
or promises * * * a defendant was induced to testify against him-
self."' 76 This is not far removed, if it is removed at all, from
the privilege against self-incrimination which is guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment, although the Court often says in these
cases1'" that the privilege against self-incrimination is not here
involved.
Other Liberties Protected in Criminal Prosecutions. The acute
concern to protect the rights of the accused against state de-
privation, shown in these cases, has also been evidenced in others.
In Mooney v. Holohan,1'7 it was said, as dictum, that if a state
contrived a conviction by the presentation of perjured testimony,
that was a denial of due process; in Smith v. O'Grady,'7 that a
conviction on a plea of guilty, made because of a promise of
173. 297 U. S. 278.
174. (1940) 309 U. S. 227. For Comment see (1940) 25 WASHINGTON
U. LAW QUARTERLY 478. In Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) 297
U. S. 28, 243-244, the Court said that "in Powell v. Alabama * * * we
concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight
amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state
aetion by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in
a criminal prosecution."
175. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 280. The intervening cases were White v. Texas
(1940) 310 U. S. 530, and three "memoranda cases": Canty v. Alabama
(1940) 309 U. S. 629, Lomax v. Texas (1941) 313 U. S. 544, and Vernon v.
Alabama (1941) 313 U. S. 547.
The most recent case is Ward v. Texas (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1139, 1143,
where the Court said, through Mr. Justice Byrnes, that it had set aside
convictions "based upon confessions extorted from ignorant persons who
have been subjected to persistent and protracted questioning, or who have
been threatened by mob violence, or who have been unlawfully held in-
communicado without advice of friends or counsel, or who have been taken
at night to lonely and isolated places for questioning. Any one of these
grounds would be sufficient cause for reversal * * * The use of a confession
obtained under such circumstances is a denial of due process * *
176. (19,41) 62 S. Ct. 289, 290.
177. E. g., in Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 U. S. 278, 285.
178. (1935) 294 U. S. 103.
179. (1941) 312 U. S. 329.
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leniency, was lacking in due process; and in Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia,110 although the conviction was affirmed (Justices Black
and Douglas dissenting), the process of "independent examina-
tion of the record" was carried to such a length that the Court
felt compelled to discuss at length a great number of incidents,
including the production of snakes at the trial. Later at the
1941-1942 term of Court, in Hysler v. Florida,1'1 the Court
affirmed a conviction for murder, which was attacked as a denial
of due process on the ground that two accomplices had testified
falsely, unknown to the prosecution; but Justices Black, Douglas
and Murphy dissented sharply. The litigation provoked by the
Court's extreme language in some of these cases was evidently
sufficient to induce Mr. Justice Roberts, in Lisenba v. California,
to formulate a rule containing some qualifications:
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the
failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we
must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected
the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as
necessarily prevent a fair trial.'82
The Court's reluctance to take into consideration the inclusion
of a particular right in the Bill of Rights, in determining whether
the same right is included in the concept of a fair trial (hence
in "the concept of due process, and so in that of liberty") has
already been noted. In Palko v. Connecticut,88 where a Connecti-
cut statute, permitting the state to appeal in a criminal prose-
cution, was attacked as in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court simply held that it was not; and was careful to
refrain from deciding either that the statute did not subject the
accused to the double jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amend-
ment,18 or that a state might subject an accused to such double
jeopardy."85 Mr. Justice Cardozo's high eloquence here is a con-
180. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 280.
181. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 688.
182. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 280, 290.
183. (1937) 302 U. S. 319. For comment see (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U.
LAw QUARTERLY 439.
184. Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U. S. 319, 322: "We do not find it
profitable to mark the precise limits of double jeopardy in Federal prosecu-
tions." The Court then cited Kepner v. United States (1904) 195 U. S. 100,
in which Justices Holmes, White, and McKenna had considered that grant-
ing a new trial upon the government's appeal did not amount to double
jeopardy.
185. Palko v. Connecticut (1937) U. S. 319, 328: "What the answer
would have to be if the State were permitted after a trial free from error
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tinuing force in the development of freedom of speech; but the
ambiguity of the decision itself is not helpful.186 And however
true it may be that the inclusion of a particular right in liberty
is not for the reason that the right was included in the Bill of
Rights, it is disturbing to feel that Mr. Justice Cardozo suggests
(here, as in the Snyder case) that the inclusion in liberty is
rather in spite of the earlier guaranty. 87
The "Court's Bill of Rights" for Criminal Prosecutions. The
third right which Madison in 1789 sought to protect against state
invasion dealt, as do these cases, with criminal prosecutions. His
proposal was confined to the right of trial by jury in such cases;
it did not extend to the right to the aid of counsel, to the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, nor to any other of the rights
guaxanteed by the Bill of Rights with respect to such prosecu-
tions. He may have considered that as against the states, guaran-
tees of these other rights were not required; or that they could
not be obtained; or, conceivably, that some of them were implicit
in the guarantee of "trial by jury." But the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court has now established,
goes beyond Madison's amendment, and the ultimate limits of
liberty 88 and due process have not yet been determined. It is
to try the accused over again or to bring another case against him, we have
no occasion to consider."
186. The case resembled Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U. S. 97,
In that it dealt with the trial by a New England court of an accused who
was--so far as appears-white. Palko, on trial for murder, was found
guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Upon
the state's appeal (two of the three grounds for which were the trial
court's exclusion of testimony as to a confession and of testimony to im-
peach Palko's credibility upon his cross-examination) a new trial resulted
and upon this trial Palko was found guilty of first degree murder and
sentenced to death. The "independent examination of the record" which the
Court made in Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, Brown v. Mississippi
(1986) 297 U. S. 278, and succeeding cases might very well have saved
Palko's life if it had been undertaken here, for the confession can hardly be
taken as an exercise of pure free will, and it appears to have been obtained
under at least one of the circumstances stated in Ward v. Texas (1942)
62 S. Ct. 1189 (note 175 supra) to be sufficient ground for setting aside the
conviction. See State v. Palko (1936) 121 Conn. 669, 679-681.
187. Note in both cases the vast array of illustrative dicta, resting upon
decisions which were long prior to Gitlow v. New York, and many of which
were very limited in their consideration of the question.
188. In the Palko case, supra note 183, the Court said that the rights
established by Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U. S. 45, Brown v. Mississippi
(1986) 297 U. S. 278, and Mooney v. Holohan (1934) 294 U. S. 103 were
fundamental and implicit in the concept of liberty; it distinguished Snyder
v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U. S. 97. No other case in this field had then
(1987) been decided.
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now apparent that the Court is working out, laboriously and
piece-meal, its own bill of rights for criminal prosecutions; for
Mr. Justice Roberts' rule must inevitably become in time a code
of well-defined prohibitions against state action, instead of a
general requirement of a "fair trial." And it seems highly de-
sirable that this crystallizing process should be accelerated as
much as possible289
For present purposes we may assume that the Court is more
competent to frame a bill of rights for the twentieth century
than were Madison and his colleagues in 1789; but it is still not
clear why the Court should not accept the aid which would
result from taking into account to some degree-however slight
-the guaranty of particular rights by the Bill of Rights. °0 The
process need not impede the inclusion of other rights, not so,
guaranteed, if that has been the deterrent. The Court might, in
the interest of obtaining a fair trial for an accused, very well
give more consideration than it has in the past to such guaran-
tees as those of the Fourth Amendment (against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the issuance of warrants except upon
probable cause), those of the Fifth (against double jeopardy and
self-incrimination), the five rights guaranteed by the Sixth (to
a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with
the adverse witnesses, to compulsory process for obtaining favor-
able witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel), and perhaps
also to the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment. Some of
these rights are certainly within the most conservative concep-
tion of due process; the denial of others obviously is inconsistent
189. The "fair trial" rule, with its concomitant "independent examina-
tion of the record," places upon the Court a burden which in the past it
has not always been able to sustain; and it is hardly likely to be more
successful in the future. Cf. Mr. Justice Black's reference, in his dissenting
opinion in Betts v. Brady (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1252, to "the prevailing view of
due process * * *, a view which gives this Court such vast supervisory
powers that I am not prepared to accept it without grave doubts." In addi-
tion, the use of the general concept opens the door to arbitrary and purely
subjective judgment, unrestrained by any rule; it leaves all state courts
uncertain of their powers; and it deprives persons accused of crime of any
assurance regarding their rights. It has never been suggested until now
that Madison would have done better to compress the Fourth and Sixth
Amendments, as well as a large part of the Fifth, into the brief require-
ment of a "fair trial."
190. As the four dissenting justices did in Snyder v. Massachusetts(1934) 291 U. S. 97, 128-131.
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with "a fair trial." By putting them out of mind the Court
makes needless difficulty for itself; for these guarantees were
devoted to the same end as Mr. Justice Roberts' rule, and, by
being specific, were a long step toward attaining it. And there
is 'no apparent reason for a lower standard of justice in state
courts than in federal courts.
The rights mentioned above, together with the First Amend-
ment rights, are the greater substance of the Bill of Rights. As
to the other amendments, it is not likely that the Third (quarter-
ing of soldiers) will be invoked against a state; nor is it likely
that the requirement of the Seventh (of trial by jury in civil
causes) will ever be applied to state courts, not only because too
many deccisions stand in the way, but because, in modern con-
ceptions, the requirement would hamper rather than aid the
administration of justice. And the qualification as to the pur-
pose' of the right to keep and bear arms (guaranteed by the
Second Amendment) would seem to make it unlikely, though
not quite inconceivable, that the Court will again be asked to
protect that right against state violation.
C. Effects of the New Liberty
In the seventeen years since Gitlow v. New York 92 the new
liberty has thus grown to include all of the rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment, the right to the assistance of counsel in
criminal prosecutions, guaranteed by the Sixth (though this has
recently been placed in a dubious position), and the general con-
cept of "a fair trial" in such cases, from which concept specific
rights are already evolving. To this extent the liberty of the
individual has so far been enlarged, at the expense of the powers
of the states. Madison's argument that "the State Governments
are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the General
Government is" has been demonstrated true. It is apparent now
that individual liberty has indeed more to fear from the states
than from the Federal Government, and more from the states'
municipalities than from the states themselves; for except in
time of war, abridgment of freedom of speech and of religious
freedom comes, not from Washington but from nearer home-
sometimes from state statutes, but more often from city or
191. See United States v. Miller (1939) 307 U. S. 174.
192. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
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county ordinances, regulations of a school board or of a state
university, decrees or judgments of a court. Commencing with
Gitlov v. New York,":' the Court has had presented to it no less
than thirty-two times the claim that state action had denied a
right guaranteed by the First Amendment; whereas in the same
seventeen-year period a similar claim appears to have been made
only three times with respect to federal action."" It is evident
that protection of the freedoms against state action has immedi-
ately vitalized them into safeguards of great practical impor-
tance, affording the protection where it is needed rather than
where it is seldom required.
But the effect of the new liberty has not been confined to the
situations in which it operates. The frequency with which the
Court has had to consider the freedoms, in enforcing them
against the states, has developed and expanded them so as to
193. Ibid.
194. In the text of this section there are mentioned seventeen cases
where the claim was made with respect to state action. Of these Schneider
v. Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147 embraced four independent cases, Bridges
v. California (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190 embraced two independent cases, and
Jones v. Opelika (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1231, three, making a total of twenty-
three. The remaining nine are Grosjean v. American P'ress Co. (1936)
297 U. S. 233 (state license tax on newspapers held to abridge freedom of
the press); Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88 (statute prohibiting
picketing held to abridge freedom of speech); Carlson v. California (1940)
310 U. S. 106 (county ordinance prohibiting picketing held to have abridged
freedom of speech); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc. (1941) 312 U. S. 287 (injunction against picketing held not to infringe
freedom of speech); American Federation of Labor v. Swing (1941) 312
U. S. 321 (injunction against peaceful picketing held to abridge freedom
of speech); Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board (1942) 62 S. Ct. 706 (order of board
prohibiting picketing other than peaceful held not to abridge freedom of
speech) ; Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl (1942) 62 S. Ct. 816 (injunction
against peaceful picketing held to abridge freedom of speech); Carpenters
& Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe (1942) 62 S. Ct. 807 (injunction against
secondary picketing held not to infringe freedom of speech) ; and Valentine
v. Chestensen (1942) 62 S. Ct. 920 (ordinance prohibiting distribution of
advertising matter in streets held not to infringe freedom of speech or of
the press).
The three cases in which the same claim was made with respect to
federal action are Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S.
Clerks (1930) 281 U. S. 548 (Railway Labor Act held not to infringe free-
dom of speech), Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board (1937)
301 U. S. 103 (National Labor Relations Act held not to abridge freedom
of the press), and National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 344 (order of N. L. R. B. held to abridge free-
dom of speech unless supported by evidence of related coercion). For com-
ment on the last case see Note (1942) 27 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY
242.
In both computations memoranda cases have been excluded.
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result in a new vitality for the rights, and this vitality will neces-
sarily persist with equal force when subsequently the freedoms
are enforced against the federal government. Cantwell v. Con-
necticut 95 has taken freedom of religion beyond the possibility
of discretionary licensing, if that should be attempted by the
federal government. Powell v. Alabama19" (before it was vitiated
by Betts v. Brady'97 ) gave the right to the assistance of counsel,
in federal prosecutions, more vitality than it ever had had be-
fore.1O8 Freedom of expression affords instances of such ex-
pansion in the clear and present danger rule (discussed at III
infra), and in the extension of freedom of the press from its
historical limit of immunity from previous restraint, to include
also freedom from subsequent punishment, which followed from
Near v. Minnesota in 1931.199 Some of the measures which the
federal government is now, in the exercise of the war power,
taking against seditious publications and speakers, 200 will in time
reach the Court, and when they do will have to contend against
a freedom of expression which has been substantially enlarged
since the Espionage Act cases of the first World War.
It should be observed also that the new liberty is establishing
a considerable degree of uniformity throughout the United States
for the freedoms to which it extends. While the state constitu-
tions have safeguards, not always identical, for freedom of
speech and of the press, the cases discussed show abundantly
that these provisions, even when they are couched in identical
language, are capable of a wide variance in construction. - l But,
195. (1940) 310 U. S. 296.
196. (1932) 287 U. S. 45.
197. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1252.
198. See Glasser v. United States (1942) 62 S. Ct. 457; Johnson v.
Zerbst (1938) 304 U. S. 458.
199. See Bridges v. California (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190; Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire (1942) 62 S. Ct. 766; Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 10-12,
378-379. As late as 1907, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Patterson v. Colorado
(1907) 205 U. S. 454, had not hesitated to base the Court's decision upon
the ground that the freedom extended only to the prevention of previous
restraints, not to the prevention of punishment after publication. In
Schenck v. United States (1919) 249 U. S. 47, he retreated from this
position.
200. See Charles G. Ross, in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 10, 1942, p.
1: 1, for discussion of steps taken to bar five publications from the mails,
and of several indictments under the Espionage Act. See also (1942) 10
Int. Jurid. Assoc. Bull. 113, 114.
201. Cf. Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting, in Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283
U. S. 697, 723: "Up to that time [1868] the right [of free speech and
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since Gitlow v. New York, 202 liberty has begun to have the same
meaning, without degree or difference, in every state in the
union. The standard applied is now identical everywhere. And
the enlargement of the freedoms which has resulted from their
protection by the Fourteenth Amendment accentuates this uni-
formity. The field in which governmental action, whether federal
or state, may constitutionally operate to restrict freedom of the
press, for example, lies somewhere between zero and the line
established in the cases following Gitlow v. New York. 2 3 Each
time the outer limit of this field is compressed, as by the clear
and present danger rule, or by the bar against subsequent pun-
ishment, the field is accordingly narrowed; and not only the
freedom, but also its uniformity throughout the states, becomes
correspondingly greater. There is no perceptible advantage in
having identical statutes held, in Georgia, Kansas and Texas, to
be unconstitutional deprivations of free speech, and in Missouri
not to be.204 The United States has now so shrunk, as a result
of the development of transit and communications, that it is be-
coming increasingly difficult to view diversities of this kind with
the equanimity, if not affection, with which they were once re-
garded. 205 It would, indeed, be surprising if it should be con-
sidered that uniformity in these fundamental matters is not
advantageous, when for a long time past uniformity in many
fields of state statute law and state common law has been so
arduously sought. Not simply because the same motion pictures
are everywhere exhibited,2 6 because the same newspaper circu-
lates in many states, because a single radio program is heard
throughout the country, is less diversity in the exercise of these
freedoms desirable; there is a greater national interest involved.
free press] was safeguarded solely by the constitutions and laws of the
States and, it may be added, they operated adequately to protect it."
202. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
203. Ibid.
204. See note 76, supra.
205. See 'Missouri v. Lewis (1880) 101 U. S. 22, 31.
206. State censorship of motion pictures, upheld in Mutual Film Corp.
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (1915) 236 U. S. 230, and Mutual Film
Corp. v. Hodges (1915) 236 U. S. 248, would seem to be now open to attack.
Cf. Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 540-548.
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III. CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
A. Origin
The clear and present danger rule was born in a dictum, grew
and was nourished in a series of dissents, and arrived at last as
a holding in the full flower of its maturity. Except for the acci-
dent of birth, it is a product of the new liberty, for these cases
were the soil in which it grew. The rule had its genesis in the
first of the Espionage Act cases to reach the Court, Sckenck v.
United States.207 There Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court, said (as dictum, for the conviction was affirmed) :
The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree.2
0 8
In the 130 years since the First Amendment was written, the
Court had never before determined the test by which the limits
of free speech might be fixed.2 0 9 The Court therefore was un-
bound by precedent when the first Espionage Act prosecution
reached it, and it chanced that the opinion then was written by
Mr. Justice Holmes. To this the dictum may be attributed, for
upon consideration, when it made a difference in the result, a
majority of the Court were unwilling to accept the test. An
earlier opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, in Fox v. Washington
2
1
0
had perhaps foreshadowed the rule; but there is persuasive
evidence that he derived it from a test for the degree of prox-
207. (1919) 249 U. S. 47.
208. Id. at 52.
209. In Patterson v. Colorado (1907) 205 U. S. 454, it had avoided the
necessity of consideration by holding that freedom of the press did not
include immunity from subsequent punishment. In Toledo Newspaper Co.
v. United States (1918) 247 U. S. 402, 419, it had similarly avoided consid-
eration by holding that the freedom did not include immunity from punish-
ment for publications which obstructed the court.
When the first Espionage Act prosecutions arose, the fact that the
Court had never construed the Amendment left a free field to the District
Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeal, and as a result various tests were in
1917 and 1918 used by them, including that of direct advocacy of resistance
to law, superseded later by one of "indirect tendency." See Note, The
Present Status of Freedom of Speech under the Federal Constitution
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 526. See also Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68,
at 42-67.
210. (1915) 236 U. S. 273, 277.
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imity to the completed crime, required for a common-law at-
tempt, which he had developed over a long period of time.211
Thomas Jefferson, in the preamble to the Virginia Statute for
Establishing Religious Freedom, wrote, in 1785, that:
* * * to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers
into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency,
is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious
liberty, because he being of course judge of that tendency
will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or
condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square
with or differ from his own; * * * it is time enough for the
rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to
interfere when principles break out into overt acts against
peace and good order.2 12
Notwithstanding this often quoted statement, which was the
reaction to the sedition prosecutions of the eighteenth century,
213
and notwithstanding also the illuminating experience of the Alien
and Sedition Laws of 1798,214 the test with which the clear and
present danger rule had to struggle for survival, and which it has
now supplanted, was one of "dangerous tendency," differing little,
if at all, from the "ill tendency" which Jefferson had condemned.
The struggle did not commence at once, for in Frohwerk v.
United States2 5 and Debs v. United States,211 both decided a
week after Schenek v. United States,2 1" the Court, still speaking
211. See Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes, 1887-1936 (1937) 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 616, 621, note: "The development of this doctrine in Mr. Justice
Holmes' mind may be traced through nearly forty years. It is suggested
in Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 68-69, and was applied while he was
on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v.
Kennedy (1897) 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770, and Commonwealth v. Peaslee
(1901) 177 Mass. 267, 59 N. E. 55. It is reiterated in Swift & Co. v. United
States (1905) 196 U. S. 375, where a 'dangerous probability' that the result
will happen is required for an attempt conviction."
212. Act of Dec. 26, 1785, 12 Hening's Statutes at Large of Virginia
(1823), c. 34, p. 85. An account of the history of this Act, which was
closely related to the subsequent guarantee of religious freedom in the
First Amendment, is contained in United States v. Reynolds (1878) 98
U. S. 145. In this case, the Court, dealing for the first time with the scope
of religious freedom, held that an act of Congress prohibiting polygamy in
the territories did not infringe the free exercise of religion by Mormons in
the Territory of Utah.
213. See Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 28-29.
214. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Abrams v. United States
(1919) 250 U. S. 616, 630. See Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 27-28.
215. (1919) 249 U. S. 204.
216. (1919) 249 U. S. 211.
217. (1919) 249 U. S. 47.
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through Mr. Justice Holmes, unanimously affirmed two more
convictions under the Espionage Act, remarking in..the Frohwerk
case that "neither Hamilton nor Madison, nor any other com-
petent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal
the counseling of a murder * * * would be an unconstitutional
interference with free speech.1 218 Neither opinion made any ref-
erence to the clear and present danger rule. Although there are
some inconsistent expressions in Debs v. United States,21 it is
hardly to be supposed that Mr. Justice Holmes would have, in
this casual fashion, modified the rule a week after he had first
enunciated it.
B. Struggle for Survival
The Espionage Cases. But with the affirmance of these con-
victions, the Court's unanimity disappeared. Eight months later,
in Abrams v. United States.2 2 0 the Court, through Mr. Justice
Clarke, affirmed another conviction, without discussion of the
test to be applied.22' Mr. Justice Holmes dissented (Mr. Justice
Brandeis concurring), saying that only "speech that produces
or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger"
2 2 of
"substantive evils," may constitutionally be punished; that "it
is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring
it about"2 28 that warrants the suppression of free speech; that
persecution for the expression of opinions seemed to him per-
fectly logical, "if you have no doubt of your premises or your
power and want a certain result with all your heart;" but that,
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
218. (1919) 249 U. S. 204, 206.
219. (1919) 249 U. S. 211. At 216 the Court approved, by implication,
a charge to the jury which had required a "natural tendency and reasonably
probable effect" to obstruct recruiting. Mr. Justice Holmes also (at 215)
spoke of "the natural and intended effect" of the speech, "its probable
effect." The use of "intended" may have resulted from the Espionage Act's
requirement of intent. See note 225 infra.
220. (1919) 250 U. S. 616. For comment, see Chafee, op. cit. supra, note
68, 108-140.
221. (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 623-624, the Court said that "the plain
purpose" of the propaganda was to excite "disaffection, sedition, riots, and
as they hoped, revolution, * * * for the purpose of embarrassing and, if
possible, defeating the military plans of the government," and that the
language was "obviously intended to provoke and to encourage resistance
to the United States in the war."
222. Abrams v. United States (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 627.
223. Id. at 628.
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good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,-that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Constitu-
tion. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every
year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate inter-
ference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country. * * *
Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous
to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants
making any exception to the sweeping command, "Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech."12 24
It will be observed that Mr. Justice Holmes had, in the first
two statements quoted, added to the rule the alternative of "in-
tent"2 25 --an alternative which would vitiate it-but that in his
final passage he omitted this. The final paragraph (which is as
eloquent and persuasive a defense of the rule as has yet been
made) also contains, in the words "pressing" and "emergency,"
some indication that the phrase "substantive evils" was on the
way to becoming "substantial evils."
This case was followed by Schaefer v. United States220 where
the Court, through Mr. Justice McKenna, again affirmed convic-
tions under the Espionage Act, saying briefly that "the tendency
of the articles and their efficacy were enough for offense." 2 7
Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented as to the convictions of
some of the defendants, on the ground that the clear and present
danger rule had not been met.V 2 The rule, Mr. Justice Brandeis
said, is "a rule of reason. Correctly applied, it will preserve the
right of free speech both from suppression by tyrannous, well-
224. Id. at 630-631.
225. The inclusion of intent as an alternative may perhaps have re-
sulted from the fact that these passages immediately followed his discus-
sion of the "intent" which the Espionage Act made a necesslary element of
the crime. Cf. the use of "intended" in Debs v. United States (1919) 249
U. S. 211.
226. (1920) 251 U. S. 466.
227. Id. at 479.
228. Id. at 482-483. Mr. Justice Clarke dissented on other grounds.
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meaning majorities, and from abuse by irresponsible, fanatical
minorities.122
9
A week later, in Pierce v. United States, 23 0 the Court, through
Mr. Justice Pitney, again affirmed convictions under the Act,
without discussion of the constitutional question. But in the
Court's opinion the word "tendency," which had made its first
appearance in Schaefer v. United States, again was used.23 1 Mr.
Justice Brandeis again dissented (with Mr. Justice Holmes'
concurrence) remarking that one question to be determined was
whether the words met the clear and present danger test.
232
This was the last of the Espionage Act cases,23 3 but the Court
almost immediately had the question before it again. In Gilbert
v. Minnesota,234 the Court, affirming a conviction under state
statute, cited all the Espionage Act decisions, but referred
neither to the clear and present danger rule nor to any other
test. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting,235 again referred to the
"clear and present danger" which might justify the suppression
of divergent opinion "because the emergency does not permit
reliance upon the slower conquest of error by truth."236
Limited Application of the Rule-Gitlow v. New York. Up
to this point the majority had studiously avoided any reference
to the rule in which (as dictum) they had incautiously acquiesced
in the Schenck case.2 7 Perhaps bearing in mind Jefferson's
words and the other considerations which have been mentioned,
they had used almost as great care to avoid reliance upon ill or
229. Id. at 482.
280. (1920) 252 U. S. 239.
281. (1920) 251 U. S. 466, 250: "at least the jury fairly might believe
that, under the circumstances existing, it would have a tendency to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, and refusal of duty in the military and navalfor'es."
282. Id. at 255. In this case, as in the preceding one, Mr. Justice Bran-
deis stated the rule in the terms of Schenck v. United States (1919) 249,
U. S. 47, omitting the alternative of "intent."
283. There was one later case, Milwaukee Publishing Company v. Burle-
son (1921) 255 U. S. 407; but this dealt with the use of the mails, and
neither the majority opinion nor the separate dissenting opinions of Justices
Brandeis and Holmes touched on clear and present danger.
284. (1920) 254 U. S. 325. The case is discussed under I, supra.
285. Mr. Justice Holmes concurred in the result, without opinion. Chief
Justice White dissented separately.
286. Gilbert v. Minnesota (1920) 254 U. S. 325, 338.
287. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Schaefer v. United States (1920) 251 U. S.
466, had referred to the rule in the Schenck case as the declaration of "a
unanimous court."
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dangerous tendency.23 But now, in Gitlow v. New York, 23" the
struggle between the two rules could no longer be suppressed.
Mr. Justice Sanford, for the majority, faced it squarely, using
the words "tendency" and "tend" without hesitation, and saying
that the "general statement in the Schenck Case" of the clear
and present danger rule "was manifestly intended, as shown by
the context," to apply only to words used to bring about a result
prohibited by law, not to words which were themselves expressly
prohibited by statute. 2 0 Mr. Justice Holmes (with whom Mr.
Justice Brandeis concurred), dissenting, said that the "criterion
sanctioned by the full court" in the Schenck case should be ap-
plied, and that here there was "no present danger of an attempt
to overthrow the government by force * * *1,241
The limited application permitted to the rule by the majority in
Gitlow v. New York 42 was, as the opinion indicates, not intended
to mean that the legislature could punish the use of any words
whatever; it was really not much more than a statement of the
doctrine, familiar in other fields of constitutional law, that the
determination of the legislature must be given "great weight,"
and was valid unless it was "arbitrary or unreasonable."243 The
Court made this clear in the next cases to come before it,
238. Although in both the Schaefer and Pierce opinions the word "ten-
dency" had crept in.
239. (1925) 268 U. S. 652. See I, supra. For contemporary comment, see
note 87, supra.
240. Gitlow v. New York (1925) 268 U. S. 652, 671. The Court said that
the clear and present danger rule "has no application to * * * [cases]
where the legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of
substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character."
241. Id. at 672-673. See Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 322-324; Note
(1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 527.
242. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.'
243. This simply postponed the test, since one was still required to
determine what was "arbitrary or unreasonable." As to this, the Court
did not speak with certainty, although the opinion definitely excludes clear
and present danger from the possibilities. Id. at 669, the Court said: "It
cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in
the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the
public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting
until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot
reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace
and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual -disturbances of
the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction;
but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger
in its incipiency." From this and other expressions, it would seem that the
Court considered that the legislature was not acting arbitrarily or unrea-
sonably if it forbade utterances because of their dangerous tendency.
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Whitney v. Californ&iaY and Fiske v. Kansas.&2 45 In Whitney v.
Californi&a2 the majority said plainly (but as dictum) that
while the determination of the legislatures must be given great
weight, and every presumption indulged in favor of the statute's
validity, the statute might still be invalid if, as applied, it was
unreasonable or arbitrary, "unwarrantably infringing any right
of free speech * * *." In Fiske v. Kansas,2 47 decided on the same
day, the Court reversed the conviction and held that a Kansas
statute, as there applied, was arbitrary and unreasonable. Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v. California,248 replied with vigor
to the majority opinion in Gitlow v. New York,'2 9 reiterating
(in a concurring opinion in which Mr. Justice Holmes joined)
"That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does
not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce,
a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the
State may constitutionally seek to prevent, has been settled.1250
He added that the legislature must decide whether a danger ex-
ists which calls for a particular protective measure, but that "the
enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which
are essential to its validity ;" and that the Court had
not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a
danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may
be and yet be deemed present; and what degree of evil shall
be deemed sufficiently substantial.to justify resort to abridg-
ment of free speech and assembly as the means of protec-
tion.2 51
As to these questions, Mr. Justice Brandeis observed that fear
of serious injury could not alone justify suppression of free
speech: there must be reasonable ground for such fear, reason-
able ground for believing that the danger apprehended was im-
minent and that the evil was a serious one. He thought that
only an emergency could justify repression, since if there was
"time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
244. (1927) 274 U. S. 357. See note 92, supra.
245. (1927) 274 U. S. 380. See note 92, supra; Note (1928) 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 525, 527-528.
246. (1927) 274 U. S. 357.
247. (1927) 274 U. S. 380.
248. (1927) 274 U. S. 357.
249. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
250. (1927) 274 U. S. 357, 373, citing the Schenck case.
251. Id. at 374.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. -25 2 And even immi-
nent danger could not justify repression, he considered, unless
the evil apprehended was "relatively serious," for prohibition
of free speech was a measure too stringent to be appropriate as
the means for averting "a relatively trivial harm to society," and
a police measure might be unconstitutional "merely because the
remedy, although effective as means of protection, is unduly
harsh or oppressive. ' 253 In a passage to which some recent de-
cisions have given relevance, Mr. Justice Brandeis said that even
"the fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppres-
sion."254 In every case where the right of free speech was claimed
to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant, he
declared, to question whether there actually was at the time a
clear danger, whether the danger was imminent, and whether
the evil apprehended was "one so substantial as to justify the
stringent restriction interposed by the legislature," whose decla-
ration "creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these con-
ditions have been satisfied. ' '2
This was the last contribution to the rule to be made by either
Mr. Justice Brandeis or Mr. Justice Holmes. At the time the
future of the rule seemed dark,256 but now, when it has been
adopted by the full Court and is being frequently applied, the
importance of Mr. Justice Brandeis' brilliant elaboration here
is evident. Mr. Justice Holmes had originated the rule and in
Abrams v. UnitedI States 57 had made a statement of the reasons
for it, so moving that it cannot be forgotten. Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, apparently realizing at once the full possibilities of the new
doctrine, had, by his persistent advocacy of it, aided in keeping
it alive, and had now, by detailed development, eliminated most
of its weaknesses and rendered it a formidable instrument for
the protection of free speech. While in this last statement of the
rule Mr. Justice Brandeis had included the alternative of intent
(apparently with deliberation, 28 but certainly without explana-
252. Id. at 377.
253. Id. at 377.
254. Id. at 378.
255. Id. at 379.
256. See Powell, op. cit. supra, note 92, at 54. Cf. (1928) 41 Harv. L.
Rev. 525, 528.
257. (1919) 250 U. S. 616.
258. See notes 219, 225, and 232, supra.
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tion), he had also elaborated each of the components of the rule
to a degree which Mr. Justice Holmes could hardly have contem-
plated, eight years earlier; and "substantive evils" had now be-
come "substantial evils," and indeed more than that, for there
must be more than violence or destruction of property.29 The
rule originally had been simply a rule of criminal law (all of
these cases were criminal prosecutions), but this development
transformed it immediately into a constitutional principle of the
highest importance, in which was foreshadowed the balance of
social interests which quite recently has become explicit in the
rule.260
For ten years after Whitney v. Californiea6l the Court made
no reference to clear and present danger, perhaps because of the
tendency (which has already been observed) to let this rule
slumber when it is not required. During this period four cases
involving freedom of speech or of the press were decided, Strom-
berg v. California,262 Near v. Minnesota,263 Grosjean v. American
Press Company2" and DeJonge v. Oregon, 65 but in each of these
cases the Court protected the freedom against abridgment by
state statutes, without consideration of the test to be applied 266
But in 1937, a few months after DeJonge v. Oregon,287 the
Court decided Herndon v. Lowry.26" Here the appellant, a Negro
Communist, was sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen to
259. Although these are certainly substantive evils which the state, in
the language of the rule as stated in the Schenck case, "has a right to
prevent."
260. See Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 105.
261. (1927) 274 U. S. 357.
262. (1931) 283 U. S. 359.
263. (1931) 283 U. S. 697.
264. (1936) 297 U. S. 233.
265. (1987) 299 U. S. 353. For comment on this case, advocating the
clear and present danger rule, but regarding it as rejected, see (1937) 50
Harv. L. Rev. 689.
266. However, in Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U. S. 697, dealing with
a Minnesota statute providing for the suppression, as a public nuisance, of a
odical which published scandalous matter, the Court, in reversing a
dgment which enjoined continued publication, refused to accept the dan-
gerous tendency doctrine. See at 721-722: "Equally unavailing is the in-
sistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal
which tends to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the
ommission of crime." The Court then cited Madison's views in opposition
to the prohibition of discussions having a "tendency and effect" to "excite
unfavorable sentiments against those who administer the government."
267. 299 U. S. 353.
268. 301 U. S. 242. For Comment see (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1313. The
case is discussed under II, supra.
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twenty years, for violation of a Georgia statute prohibiting at-
tempts to induce insurrection, including the circulation of pamph-
lets for that purpose. He appears to have had an eminently fair
trial, and he was well represented by counsel; but the Supreme
Court of Georgia, following Gitlow v. New York"9D faithfully,
had applied the dangerous tendency rule to affirm his conviction.
Nothing short of clear and present danger could have saved ,him,
and indeed so firm a friend of freedom of speech as Mr. Zechariah
Chafee appears to consider that even that was hardly enough,
upon the facts.2 70 Mr. Justice Roberts, for the five-to-four
majority,2 1 reversed the conviction, saying briefly, without refer-
ence to any authority, that under the statute, as construed, the
judge and jury could not appraise "the circumstances and char-
acter of the defendant's utterances or activities as begetting a
clear and present danger of forcible obstruction of a particular
state function. ' ' 272 He followed this by discussion and rejection
of the dangerous tendency rule; and added that "the penalizing
even of utterances of a defined character must find its justifica-
tion in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized govern-
ment," that "The judgment of the legislature is not unfettered,"
and that the "limitation upon individual liberty must have ap-
propriate relation to the safety of the state.'"2ls Mr. Justice
Brandeis, perhaps content to go one step at a time, concurred
in this opinion, without hazarding a separate one.
It will be noted that nothing was said regarding the alterna-
tive of intent, which here might have made the result more diffi-
cut to attain.2 74 It should be observed also that the Court here
was dealing not only with the right of free speech, but also with
the right "peaceably to assemble," and that the application of
clear and present danger extended to both.
269. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
270. Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 397-398.
271. The others were Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone
and Cardozo. Of the five, ,only Justices Brandeis and Stone had been mnem-
bers of the Court when Whitney v. California (1927) 274 U. S. 357, was
decided.
272. Herndon v. Lowry (1937) 301 U. S. 242, 261.
273. Id. at 258. The reversal was also based upon the view that the
statute as construed and applied was too vague and indefinite to provide
a reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt.
274. Cf. Mr. Justice Van Devanter's dissenting opinion, id. at 264, and
especially at 277.
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C. Complete Acceptance-Thornhil v. Alabnm
The rule275 was not used by the Court in protecting freedom
of speech or press in three cases2 78 in 1938 and 1939. In 1940,
however, Thornhill v. Alabam. 2 77-- a decision of great importance
-made it clear that the rule had the support of virtually the full
Court, as then constituted.2 78 Mr. Justice Murphy, reversing a
conviction under a statute prohibiting picketing, said that "the
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dis-
pute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
that is guaranteed by the Constitution, 2 7 9 and that abridgment
of the freedom of such discussion could be justified "only where
the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances
affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competi-
tion for acceptance in the market of public opinion."''  The
danger of injury to an industrial concern was, he held, "neither
so serious nor so imminent as to justify" suppression of freedom
of discussion. 281 And the Court now added to the rule, in terms,
the balance of social interests which Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Whitney case had approached.2 82
275. While Herndon v. Lowry (1937) 301 U. S. 242, was a holding for
clear and present danger, the character of the opinion, the fact that only
a bare majority had acquiesced in it, and the great change in the composi-
tion of the Court which now ensued, still left the position of the rule in
some doubt.
276. Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U..S. 444; Hague v. C. I. 0. (1939)
807 U. S. 497 (see note 34, supra); and Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308
U. S. 147. These cases are discussed above under II.
277. (1940) 310 U. S. 88. For comment, see Note (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev.99.
278. Mr. Justice McReynolds, who, alone of the four dissenting justices
in Herndon v. Lowry (1937) 301 U. S. 242, was still a member of the Court,
dissented without opinion.
279. Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 102.
280. Id. at 104-105. As authority he cited, not Herndon v. Lowry (1937)
801 U. S. 242, but Mr. Justice Holmes' opinions in the Schenck and Abrams
cases, this language being taken from the latter.
281. It had been urged that the purpose of the statute was to protect
the community from violence and breaches of the peace, "the concomitants
of picketing," but as to this the Court said that "no clear and present danger
of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or
breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent," in the activities of
every picket, and that it was "not now concerned with picketing en masse
or otherwise conducted which might occasion such imminent and aggravated
danger to these interests as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover
the precise situation ** **" Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 105.
282. Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 105. The Court said that
the statute here did not "evidence any such care in balancing these interests
against the interests of the community and that of the individual in free-
dom of discussion on matters of public concern."
To regard this element of balance as a development of the rule, instead
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On the same day the Court followed the Thornhill case in
Carlson v. California.-3 Through Mr. Justice Murphy it invali-
dated a county ordinance prohibiting picketing (including the
carrying of signs and banners), again applying the clear and
present danger rule.
Four weeks later, in CantwelZ v. Connecticut 8' Mr. Justice
Roberts, for a Court which was now unanimous, applied the clear
and present danger rule to reverse a conviction of the common
law offense of inciting a breach of the peace,2 based upon play-
ing a phonograph record upon the street. The Court said that
although the contents of the record "not unnaturally aroused ani-
mosity," in the absence of a statute "narrowly drawn to define
and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present
danger to a substantial interest of the State,"286 there was "no
such clear and present menace to public peace and order" as to
justify abridgment of the freedom. 817 For authority, the Court
said: "Compare Schenck v. United States, Herndon v. Lowry,
Thornhill v. Alabama."-8
The Peaceful Picketing Cases. Less than a year after Thorn-
hilt v. Alabama, 189 the Court entered upon a series of five cases
involving peaceful picketing. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmwor DairieseDO divided the Court sharply. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, for the six justices composing the majority, affirmed
the reversal, by the Supreme Court of Illinois, of a decree per-
mitting peaceful picketing. While reaffirming the Thornhilt
case,29' he said that a state could nevertheless enjoin "acts of
of as a limitation upon it, of course presupposes that in the balancing great
weight will be given to freedom of speech.
283. (1940) 310 U. S. 106.
284. (1940) 310 U. S. 296. The case is considered under II, supra.
285. A conviction on another count was reversed on the ground that it
invaded the free exercise of religion, but in connection with this there was
no reference to clear and present danger.
286. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 246, 311. The Court said
(at 308) that such a statutory declaration "would weigh heavily in any
challenge of the law as infringing constitutional limitations."
287. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296, 311, the Court said
also that a state could not unduly suppress "free communication of views,
religious or other * * *"
288. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296 established-if there
was any question regarding it-that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited
abridgment of freedom of speech by a state court, as well as by state
legislation.
289. (1940) 310 U. S. 88.
290. (1941) 312 U. S. 287. For Comment, see (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev.
727; (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1064.
291. This, he said, was "precisely the kind of situation which the Thorn-
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picketing in themselves peaceful," when, as here, they were "en-
meshed with contemporaneously violent conduct;" that the guar-
anty of free speech was based upon "faith in the power of an
appeal to reason" by all peaceful means and was given a "gener-
ous scope" in order to avert "force and explosions," but that
"utterance in a context of violence" could "lose its significance
as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of
force;" and that such utterance "was not meant to be sheltered
by the Constitution.1292 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting for himself
and Mr. Justice Douglas, remarked that the injunction banned
the discussion of "matters of public concern," within the "area"
declared by the Thrnhi/ case to be protected by the First
Amendment; and considered that application of the clear and
present danger rule (which Mr. Justice Frankfurter had not
mentioned) invalidated it. " s Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting sepa-
rately, said that the Court had now determined that "where there
is a background of violence, and inferentially * * * where there
is a reasonable fear of violence," freedom of speech might be
withdrawn; that the remedy for the "fear engendered by past
misconduct" lay "in the maintenance of order, not in denial of
free speech;" and that "free speech may be absolutely prohibited
only under the most pressing national emergencies. Those emer-
gencies must be of the kind that justify the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus or the suppression of the right of trial by
jury.,,294
hill opinion excluded from its scope." Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-
moor Dairies (1941) 312 U. S. 287, 297.
292. He added that the injunction was justified "only so long as it
counteracts a continuing intimidation," and that it might be modified or
vacated when this ceased.
It has been suggested that the decision is in conflict with Near v.
Minnesota (1931) 283 U. S. 697, which held that prior misconduct did not
justify restraint. But there seem to be distinctions, both in the seriousness
of the evils and in the likelihood of their continuance.
293. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies (1941) 312
U. S. 287. At 313 he said that the record failed to show "such imminent,
clear and present danger" as to justify abridgment. At 316-317: "When clear
and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace or order appears,
the power of the Illinois courts to prevent or punish is obvious." As author-
ity, there were cited not only Mr. Justice Holmes' opinions in the Schenck
and Abrams cases, and the recent holdings, but also, for the first time, the
dissenting opinions in the Schaefer, Pierce, and Gitlow cases, and Mr.
Justice Brandeis' opinion in the Whitney case.
294. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowinoor Dairies (1941) 312 U. S.
287, 320. As authority, he cited Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88.
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On the same day as the Meadownwor case, in American Fed-
eration of Labor v. Swing,295 the Court, again through Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, held that freedom of speech was infringed by
the injunction of a state court against peaceful picketing "con-
ducted by strangers to the employer." It considered that the
"right of free communication" could not be "mutilated" by deny-
ing it to a union which had unsuccessfully attempted to unionize
a business, even though there was no controversy between the
employer and his own employees. 28  Clear and present danger
was not mentioned. This case was followed by Hotel and Res-
taurant Employees' Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board,2 97 where the Court simply held that an order of the Board,
and the statute under which this was made, as construed by the
state court, permitted peaceful picketing, and therefore left free-
dom of speech unimpaired. A little later, in Bakery and Pastry
Drivers v. Wohl,298 the Court, through Mr. Justice Jackson, held
that peaceful picketing of peddlers,2 99 having no employees, by
a union seeking to compel them to employ relief drivers, 30 might
not be enjoined, saying that it could "perceive no substantive evil
of such magnitude as to mark a limit to the right of free speech. 31
Mr. Justice Douglas (speaking for Justices Black and Murphy
also) concurred separately, laying emphasis on the clear and
present danger rule (as stated in Thornhill v. Alabama 2).
The last of these cases, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's
Cafe, 30 3 was decided the same day as the Wohl case. Here the
Court, once more through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, affirmed a
295. (1941) 312 U. S. 321. For Comment, see (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev.
1066.
296. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result. Mr. Justice
Roberts dissented, without opinion.
297. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 706.
298. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 816.
299. Carried out by picketing both the bakeries from whom they bought
their products, and the customers to whom they sold.
300. The peddlers averaged approximately thirty-two dollars per week,
out of which they had to absorb credit losses and maintain delivery trucks.
The union demanded that they hire relief drivers, at nine dollars per day,
for one day a week.
301. It added that, while a state was not required to "tolerate in all
places and under all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individ-
ual," here it was "practically impossible" for the union to make known its
grievances by other means, and that the picketing could have "slight, if
any, repercussions upon the interests of strangers to the issue."
302. (1900) 310 U. S. 88.
303. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 807.
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Texas decree enjoining peaceful picketing. Carpenters' and
painters' unions had picketed Ritter's restaurant, although there
was no controversy between Ritter and his employees or their
union, solely because Ritter had contracted for the erection of a
building (wholly unconnected with the restaurant and a mile
and a half way from it) and his contractor had then employed
non-union carpenters and painters. The decree permitted picket-
ing at the building under construction. The Court held that
while peaceful picketing might "be a phase of the constitutional
right of free utterance," that did not imply that it could not be
confined to "the area of the industry" within which the dispute
arose. The state, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, could constitu-
tionally prohibit "conscription of neutrals," in these circum-
stances.80' Mr. Justice Black (in whose dissenting opinion Jus-
tices Douglas and Murphy concurred) urged that the Thornhill
case had established that "injury to a particular person's busi-
ness * * * was insufficient to justify curtailment of free expres-
sion."1105 Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting separately, pointed out that
the result was inconsistent with the Wohl case, and said that
"until today orderly, regulated picketing has been within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment," that "in balancing
social advantages it has been felt that the preservation of free
speech in labor disputes was more important than the freedom
of enterprise from the burdens of the picket line."308
The Bridges Case. Shortly before the last three cases were
decided, the Court, in Bridges v. California,307 a five-to-four deci-
sion, gave clear and present danger detailed consideration. Mr.
Justice Black, for the majority, applied the test to convictions
of contempt of court, based upon newspaper editorials and a tele-
gram which referred to causes then pending. For the first time,
Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Whitney v. California001 was
quoted309 and applied. Mr. Justice Black said that "what finally
304. Again Mr. Justice Frankfurter made no mention of clear and
present danger, but his opinion is not inconsistent with it.
305. Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe (1942) 62 S. Ct.
807, 810.
806. Id. at 815. He added that while the Court had limited its holding
"to the peculiar circumstances" of the case, "all decisions necessarily are
so limited, but from the decisions rules are drawn."
307. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190. For comment, see Radin, Freedom of Speech
and Contempt of Court (1942) 36 Ill. L. Rev. 599.
308. (1927) 274 U. S. 357.
309. The statement that the likelihood of some violence or of destruction
of property was not enough to justify suppression, was omitted. It could
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emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can
be punished."3"0D "Those cases," he added, "do not purport to
mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected ex-
pression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a
minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights," for the First Amend-
ment unequivocally "prohibits any law abridging freedom of
speech or of the press," and "must be taken as a command of
the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context
of a liberty-loving society, will allow." 311 "History," he said, "af-
fords no support for the contention that the criteria applicable
under the Constitution to other types of utterances are not ap-
plicable, in contempt proceedings, to out-of-court publications
pertaining to a pending case."'312 The utterances here were then
appraised to determine to what extent the substantive evils of
"disrespect for the judiciary" and "disorderly and unfair admin-
istration of justice" were likely consequences, and "whether the
degree of likelihood was sufficient to justify summary punish-
ment." Upon this appraisal, the Court found no clear and pres-
ent danger of the evils, sufficient to outweigh the advantage of
liberty of expression. 3"3
in any event have had no application to the facts of this case. The alter-
native of intent, which might have been relevant, was also omitted.
310. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190, 194.
311. Ibid.
312. Id. at 196.
313. As to one editorial, Mr. Justice Black said that "the basis for
punishing the publication as contempt was by the trial court said to be its
'inherent tendency' and by the Supreme Court its 'reasonable tendency' to
interfere with the orderly administration of justice" in a pending case;
that "in accordance with what we have said on the 'clear and present
danger' cases, neither 'inherent tendency' nor 'reasonable tendency' is
enough to justify a restriction of free expression"; but that "even if they
were appropriate, measures, we should find exaggeration in the use of those
phrases to describe the facts here." Id. at 198.
The California court, deciding these cases after Herndon v. Lowry
(1937) 301 U. S. 242, had had clear and present danger urged on it, but had
deliberately rejected the test in favor of "reasonable tendency." Bridges
v. Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal. (2d) 464, 94 P. (2d) 983; Times-Mirror
Co. v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal. (2d) 99, 98 P. (2d) 1029.
Mr. Justice Black observed that the "practical result of the decisions
below" was to discourage public expression perhaps more effectively than
a "deliberate statutory scheme of censorship" would have done, for under
a legislative specification of the prohibitions one "might at least have an
authoritative guide to the permissible scope of comment, instead of being
compelled to act at the peril that judges might find in the utterance a
'reasonable tendency' to obstruct justice in a pending case." Bridges v.
California (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190, 196-197.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter (with whom concurred Chief Justice
Stone and Justices Roberts and Byrnes) 314 dissented in this case,
saying that the utterances here were not, historically, exercises
of the freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, that "the
Bill of Rights is not self-destructive," and that "freedom of ex-
pression can hardly carry implications that nullify the guaran-
tees of impartial trials."315 Exercise of the contempt power was
justified, he considered, if a publication constituted a threat to
"the impartial disposition" of a pending cause, "calculated to
create an atmospheric pressure incompatible with rational, im-
partial adjudication"; but "to interfere with justice it need not
succeed."''' 6 As to the test to determine this, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said: "It was urged before us that the words 'reasonable
tendency' had a fatal pervasiveness, and that their replacement
by 'clear and present danger' was required to state a constitu-
tionally permissible rule of law. * * * The Constitution does not
require replacement of an historic test by a phrase which first
gained currency on March 3, 1919."'117 He added that "clear and
present danger" was "merely a justification for curbing utter-
ance that is warranted by the substantive evil to be prevented.
The phrase itself is an expression of tendency and not of accom-
plishment. The literal difference between it and 'reasonable ten-
dency' is not of constitutional dimension.1318 Here, he continued,
"the substantive evil to be eliminated is interference with im-
partial adjudication. To determine what interferences may be
made the basis for contempt tenders precisely the same kind of
issues as that to which the 'clear and present danger' test gives
rise * * *. The question always is-was there a real and sub-
814. Of these four, only Mr. Justice Roberts (in Herndon v. Lowry(1987) 801 U. S. 242, and Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U. S. 296)
has written opinions approving clear and present danger. All five of the
majority have made use of the rule, although the use of it by Mr. Justice
Reed (in the Meadowmoor case) and by Mr. Justice Jackson (in the Wohl
case) was not in complete terms.
815. Bridges v. California (1942) 62 S. Ct. 190, 204.
816. Id. at 208. He added: "As with other offenses, the state should be
able to proscribe attempts that fail because of the danger that attempts
may succeed."
817. Id. at 209. The date of Schenck v. United States.
818. Id. at 210. Mr. Radin considers that the minority opinion supports
the "reasonable tendency" rule. See Radin, op. cit. supra, note 307, at 603.
But it does not appear that Mr. Justice Frankfurter went so far; he said
that "reasonable tendency" might constitutionally be used by a state, but
there is no expression of preference as between it and clear and present
danger. Cf. (1942) 10 Int. Jurid. Assoc. Bull. 115, 118.
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stantial threat * * * close and direct," to the impartial decision
of a particular case immediately pending. The minority con-
cluded that here there were such threats.3 119
Progresg of the Rule. The progress of the rule, from the bare
statement in Thornhill v. Alabama,320 to the inclusion in Bridges
v. California321 of most of Mr. Justice Brandeis' final elaboration,
has been gradual but rapid. It was made possible by the fre-
quency with which during this twenty-month period the Court
had to consider freedom of expression, but the progress itself
has been largely due to Mr. Justice Black's increasing apprecia-
319. Bridges v. California (1942) 62 S. Ct. 190, 210. It was unnecessary
to balance the evil against abridgment of the freedom, under Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's view that utterances such as these were not an exercise of
free speech or freedom of the press, historically. (Cf. Radin, op. cit. supra,
note 307, 613, suggesting that it would be difficult to establish that the
framers of the First Amendment meant to exclude such utterances).
Another point made by Mr. Justice Frankfurter: That one of the peti-
tioners was an alien and one a corporation (Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters
(1925) 268 U. S. 510, 535).
The effect of Bridges v. California supra, in state courts was immediate.
In Graham v. Jones (La., 1942), 7 So. (2d) 688, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, reversing rules for contempt which had been instituted against
New Orleans newspapers, said that the editorials which constituted the
contempt indisputably "tended materially to affect the orderly administra-
tion of justice" in a cause then pending, that they were clearly "contempts
of this Court" and that if it were not for the repudiation by Bridges v.
California of the reasonable tendency rule and the overruling, in effect, of
the jurisprudence, refusing to extend the constitutional protection of liberty
of the press and freedom of speech to such acts, it would have been the
duty of the court to punish the contempts. Bridges v. California, the court
added, not only required a clear and present danger that a publication out
of court would influence the decision in a pending case, but went further,
for the evil must be "extremely serious" and the "degree of imminence
extremely high." "We cannot truthfully say," the court continued, "that
the result of the publications here was to create a clear and present danger
of substantive evils," for, "although the obvious purpose of the editorials
was to force a decision by this court in accordance with" the writers' de-
sires, "there never was any clear and present danger that their purpose
could or would be accomplished."
While Bridges v. California supra, was awaiting decision clear and
present danger was urged upon the Supreme Court of Missouri as a bar
to the punishment of a newspaper for contempt for the publication of
editorials and a cartoon critical of a judge. This court, however, deciding
in advance of Bridges v. California, supra, was able to discharge the al-
leged contemners without mention of the test. It did point out that "a
balance" between freedom of the press and "other social interests such as
the preservation of order and the right of litigants to a fair trial" must
be struck. State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Company v. Coleman (1941)
347 Mo. 1238, 152 S. W. (2d) 640. For comment on this case, see Goldstein,
Contempt of Court and the Press in Missouri (1942) 7 Mo. L. Rev. 229;
(1941) 26 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 564.
320. (1940) 310 U. S. 88.
321. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 190.
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tion of the rule's possibilities. Abandonment of the alternative
of intent must be regarded as deliberate. The Court has also, it
appears, been unwilling to accept the most extreme of Mr. Justice
Brandeis' postulates--that even clear and present danger of
"some violence" or of "destruction of property" is not enough
to justify suppression of the freedom-for this has been con-
sistently omitted, even in a case such as the Meadowmoor case.
32 2
The balancing of social interests, first explicitly announced in
the Thornhill case, has in the later cases not always been per-
formed as consciously or as carefully as might be desired; it is
of course dangerous unless adequate weight is attached to the
freedom. But Mr. Justice Black's treatment of clear and present
danger, in the Bridges case, as simply a minimum compulsion,
which by no means marks the furthermost constitutional boun-
dary of protected expression, seems to leave ample room for
further development.
Scope of the Rule. While in Schenck v. United Statee23 Mr.
Justice Holmes-and in later cases both he and Mr. Justice
Brandeis-said that clear and present danger was the test "in
every case," all of the cases in which they spoke of the rule (and,
for that matter, Herndon v. Lowry324 also) had two common ele-
ments: they dealt with (1) the suppression (2) of utterances
which were essentially political (by socialists, communists, syn-
dicalists or plain pro-Germans). From this it might have been
argued that the rule was to be applied only "in every case" hav-
ing one or other or perhaps both of these characteristics. The
recent decisions seem to indicate that the Court regards the rule
as applicable only to the outright suppression of speech32 5---not
to the licensing, or taxing, or otherwise burdening of it. The
Court has at any rate refrained from referring to the rule in
any case of this latter class,3 286 even though in some of these the
322. Where it might have lent support to Mr. Justice Black's conclusion.
323. (1919) 249 U. S. 47.
324. (1937) 301 U. S. 242.
325. Although Mr. Justice Brandeis, in the Whitney case, spoke of it
as applying to "restriction" as well as to "suppression."
326. Including not only Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444, and
Schneider v. Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147 (the Irvington ordinance),
which were decided before the Thornhill case (see notes 275 and 276 supra),
but also such later cases as Cox v. New Hampshire (1941) 312 U. S. 569,
and Jones v. Opelika (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1231, in both of which freedom of
expression was denied protection. Perhaps it should be noted that in the
Jones case Mr. Justice Reed, for the majority, said that the only allowable
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restraint appeared to amount, in effect, to an absolute prohibi-
tion. Such cases, although they require one additional appraisal
(the extent of the restraint), would seem capable of being fitted
into the rule.
The Court has not, however, hesitated to extend the rule to
utterances of a non-political character. Thornhill v. Alabam1 21
and the cases following it applied the rule to picketing which
was in no sense political; Cantwell v. ConnectjicoUt 28 applied it
to religious utterances; and Bridges v. Californi 32 9 applied it
to utterances which, while perhaps in one sense political, were
still quite different from those in the earlier cases.
But the Court, in applying the rule to utterances in one of
these new fields-peaceful picketing-has unfortunately been
tempted to support the extension by saying that "in the circum-
stances of our times the dissemination of information concern-
ing the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that
area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. 3 0
While this expression was well-intended, being used to support
the freedom in the particular case, it seems to be inherently
dangerous; for the statement that there are areas protected by
the Constitution assumes that there are also areas which are
not.33 1 The First Amendment protects all speech, not simply
interferences with freedom of expression are "those appropriate to the
maintenance of a civilized society," and that in determining what limita-
tions may be permitted "under such an abstract test" the courts are to be
"guided by the experience of the past, the needs of revenue for law enforce-
ment, the requirements and capacities of police protection, the dangers of
disorder and other pertinent factors." But this is not clear and present
danger.
327. (1940) 310 U. S. 88.
328. (1940) 310 U. S. 296.
329. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190.
330. This was first used in Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88, 102,
where it was preceded by a sentence which, to an extent, qualified it ("Free-
dom of discussion * * * must embrace all issues about which information
is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period"). But when later repeated or paraphrased (in
Carlson v. California (1940) 310 U. S. 106, 113; by Mr. Justice Black in
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies (1941) 312 U. S. 287,
303; by Mr. Justice Douglas in Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl (1942)
62 S. Ct. 816; and by Justices Black and Reed in Carpenters & Joiners
Union v. Ritter's Cafe (1942) 62 S. Ct. 807), the qualifying sentence was
omitted. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who has spoken for the Court in four
picketing cases, has carefully avoided this language.
331. This talk of areas stems only from Thornhill v. Alabama (1940)
310 U. S. 88. In Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444, and in Schneider v.
Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147, the ordinances held to be an invalid in-
vasion of the freedom related to the distribution of literature or handbills
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some speech, or speech on such topics as a majority of the Court
may from time to time regard with favor. The nature of the
utterance cannot be a condition of the constitutional protection;
it is time enough to appraise the social value when the Court
reaches the stage of balancing that against the clear and present
danger of threatened evil. 32 The extent to which the Court has
permitted itself to think in terms of "areas" is evident in the
recent case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,333 where the Court,
through Mr. Justice Roberts, reversing an injunction against
enforcement of a New York ordinance absolutely prohibiting the
distribution of advertising matter on the streets, said that while
it had "unequivocally held" that the streets were "proper places
for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information
and disseminating opinion" and that this privilege might not be
unduly burdened or proscribed, nevertheless the Court was
"equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising."33' The
Court can hardly mean to say that "commercial advertising" is
wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. It should
have deferred consideration of the nature of the literature until
it struck a balance, and even then it would be difficult to obtain
support for the view that commercial advertising is wholly with-
out social value.-'
Application of the Rule to Freedom of Assembly and Religion.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. Californiasse applied clear
and present danger to abridgment of the right "peaceably to as-
semble," as well as of freedom of speech, and the majority made
a similar application in Herndon v. Loury.337 This seems to have
of any kind, and the latter decision protected literature on a wide variety
of subjects.
3S2. When the attempt is made, it is extraordinarily difficult to find any
speech in which there may not, under given circumstances, be social value-
and from this test neither profanity nor Mr. Justice Holmes' rather over-
worked "cry of fire in a crowded theatre" (Schenck v. United States (1919)
249 U. S. 47, 52; cf. Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 15) need be barred.
333. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 920.
334. Id. at 921.
385. The decision itself may be right, although this cannot be discovered
from the Court's opinion. See Chrestensen v. Valentine (C. C. A. 2, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 511, particularly the dissenting opinion of Judge Frank. It
may be suggested that picketing, as in the Swing case, may be actuated
primarily by the profit motive (of the union), as much as any other ad-
vertising.
336. (1927) 274 U. S. 357, 374, 378-379.
337. (1937) 301 U. S. 242.
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been settled. But the Court has been unwilling to apply the rule
to abridgment of the free exercise of religion-although free-
dom of speech is as closely allied with this right as with freedom
of assembly, and although the dangerous tendency rule was ap-
plied historically to both freedoms alike.83 8 Clear and present
danger would apparently have produced a different result in
Hamilton v. University of California,131 and in Minersville SchOol
District v. Gobitis,340 (in both of which there was complete sup-
pression of religious freedom without corresponding suppression
of freedom of speech.)341 However, the recent weakening of the
authority of the Gobitis case34 2 may perhaps presage the ultimate
extension of the rule to abridgment of the free exercise of re-
ligion.
CONCLUSION
The "legislative determination," which was so nearly fatal to
the rule in Gitlow v. New York, 34 was apparently only scotched
by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 344 not killed. In Cantwell v. Connecti-
out3 and elsewhere the Court has been betrayed, by the absence
of any legislation, into unfortunately broad dicta regarding what
the effect of such legislation might have been. This language is
perhaps not to be taken at its face value,3 " but if it should again
338. Jefferson's denunciation of it occurs in the Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom.
339. (1934) 293 U. S. 245.
340. (1940) 310 U. S. 586. See, Compulsory Flag Salutes and Religious
Freedom, Note, (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1418, 1422, written in advance of
the Gobitis decision, but taking it for granted that clear and present danger
was to be applied.
341. Except that in the Gobitis case there was invasion of the "freedom
of silence."
342. By the repudiation of it by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy,
in Jones v. Opelika (1942) 62 S. Ct. 1231. See supra under II.
343. (1925) 268 U. S. 652.
344. Whitney v. California (1927) 274 U. S. 357, 374.
345. (1940) 310 U. S. 296, 307-308: "Such a declaration of the State's
policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing con-
stitutional limitations," quoted by Mr. Justice Black in Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies (1941) 312 U. S. 287, 306, and in Bridges
v. California (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190, 192. See also Mr. Justice Black, in the
Bridges case supra, at 193: "The judgments below * * * do not come to us
encased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation."
346. The Court has usually quoted also the sentence from Schneider v.
Irvington (1939) 308 U. S. 147, 161: "Mere legislative preferences or
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regula-
tion directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify"
abridgment of freedom of speech. In Bridges v. California (1941) 62 S. Ct.
190, Mr. Justice Black seems to include this in the clear and present danger
rule.
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develop into a presumption that the statute is valid (as in the
Gitlow case), then it might be shortly answered that from the
First Amendment there arises a presumption of the right of
speech to protection, and that the constitutional presumption, at
the least, cancels the statutory.3 47
Clear and present danger fits well enough into our constitu-
tional scheme. Certainly no liberty guaranteed by any amend-
ment other than the First may be abridged simply because of a
speculative "tendency" that its exercise may be harmful to the
state.3 48 But one cannot speak with equal certainty regarding
the absolute merit of the rule in its present state of develop-
ment. "Clear," "present," "imminent," "serious," "substantial"
are all words of emphasis, but the future tense is implicit in the
word "danger." The new rule modified "dangerous tendency,"
adding a different emphasis, using a new accent; but it is still
essentially a subjective test ;349 indeed, the Court is now required
to appraise, with no fixed objective standard, not only the danger
and the evil, but the social value of the utterance. The picketing
cases have *been stated in some detail in order that the wide
differences possible in such subjective appraisals may be appar-
ent3 50 In "a question of degree," emphasis is important; but it
may not be enough. Because they saw the rule's inherent weak-
347. Cf. Chief Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
(1938) 304 U. S. 144, 152. "There may be narrower scope for operation
of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth." Cf. also his dissenting opinion in Miners-
vile School District v. Gobitis (1940) 310 U. S. 586, 604-605.
See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Bridges v. California (1941) 62
S. Ct. 190, 208: "When a substantial claim of an abridgment of these
liberties is advanced, the presumption of validity that belongs to an exer-
cise of state power must not be allowed to impair such a liberty * * *"
Cf. Frankfurter and Landis, A Study in the Federal Judicial System
(1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1123-1125.
348. Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) 300 U. S. 379, for the
test for abridgment of liberty of contract; for state abridgment of the
rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, cf. the writer's Note,
Civil Conscription in the United States (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 265, and
Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 32-33; cf. Warren, supra note 4, at 463-
464, for due process generally.
349. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Bridges v.
California (1941) 62 S. Ct. 190; cf. Powell, op. cit. supra, note 92, at 74:
"We may wonder, too, whether the present-danger test which the minority
sought to establish is one that could be applied with anything approaching
factual accuracy by an appellate court."
350. Cf. Chafee, op. cit. supra, note 68, at 436n: "The majority [in the
Meadowmoor case] merely took a different view of the facts."
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ness, Mr. Justice Holmes, and in particular Mr. Justice Brandeis,
made every effort to strengthen it-efforts which, though bold
and ingenious, were only partially successful. The difficulty is
inherent in the punishment of words before they have caused-
and when they may never cause-evil.
It is true that thus far the rule has worked well to protect
freedom of expression. Indeed, commencing with Herdon v.
Lowry, 51 in every case where the rule has been mentioned by
the majority, the freedom has been maintained .3 2 On the other
hand, in cases such as Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-
moor Dairies-53 and Carpenters' & Joiners Union v. Ritter's
Cafe,85 the rule has been stated by a minority seeking to protect
the liberty, and the majority opinion has been studiously silent
as to it. The mere statement of the rule has, so far, been an
influence in advancing freedom of speech. But this is likely to
be true more often when the rule is new, before its emphasis
has been blunted, its accents blurred, than later, when it has
become simply an habitual formula. The cases now arising under
the Espionage Act may very well determine the future of clear
and present danger; the rule may be abandoned, modified, or
expanded, and if the latter course should be taken it is remotely
possible that a means may be found to embody in it some objec-
tive term. But, viewed as of today, clear and present danger
while it has become a formidable weapon for the defense of
freedom of speech and of the press, appears likely to remain
formidable only so long as it is wielded by a willing arm.
351. (1937) 301 U. S. 242.
352. With perhaps one exception, all of these cases seem to have been
decided rightly, either in terms of clear and present danger or otherwise.
The exception is the Wohl case, which, though decided by a unanimous
court, seems in need of limitation; indeed, this process may have already
begun, as Mr. Justice Reed suggested in the Ritter's Cafe case.
353. (1941) 312 U. S. 287.
354. (1942) 62 S. Ct. 807.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss4/1
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Edited by the Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law,
St. Louis. Published in December, February, April, and June at
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
Subscription Price $2.50 per Annum.
Back numbers, $1.00.
Single copies, 75 cents.
A subscriber desiring to discontinue his subscription should send notice to
that effect. In the absence of such notice, the subscription will be continued.
THE BOARD OF EDITORS
VINIA Mousy, Editor-in-Chief
ALVIN M. EXTzN, Comment Editor JOHN R. SToCKHAM, Note Editor
RAY T. SAMPLE, Book Review Editor
JOHN W. FUSON, Beminess Manager
DONALD ABR-AMs
DAv L. COENFELD
JOSEPH EDLIN
HAxvEY M. FISHER
STAFF
MYRON GOLLuB
HORACE S. HASELTINE
J. D. HENNIGAN
FACULTY ADVISOR
A. C. BECHT
RODHAM W. KENNER
VIRGINIA T. MEmiL=
PAUL B. RAVA
ROBERT S. SKINNER
ADVISORY BOARD
N. PARKER, Chairmn C. B. PEPER, Secretar
R. L. AONSON A. GARLAND F. E. MATHEWS
F. P. ASCHMEYMr J. J. GRAVELY D. L. MILLAR
THzonoua BARON J. GRoss R. R. NuHoFF
G. A. Buys, JR. A. M. HOENNY E. M. SCHAEFER, JR.
R. S. BuLL H. W. JONES G. W. SIMPKxiNS
B. W. CHUBB F. R. KENNEDY R. B. SNOW
J. M. DouGLAs F. L. KUHLMANN K. P. SPENCER
S. EiSON T. LEWIN M. L. STEWART
W. FREDmAN A. E. MAROLIN E. SUSMAN
Washington University Open Scholarship
